Russian culture does not live for itself alone. It has the great calling to serve as bearer and nurturer of the tens of young national cultures of our Union.
—D. Iuzhin (1930)

The rulers of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union displayed a remarkably successful capacity to govern in and through language, to exploit its strengths and weaknesses, its varieties of words and grammars, in order to maintain power over the political spaces they have called either Rossiia, or the Soviet Union, or Evraziiia. This is the language factor in the era of the three Russian revolutions, encompassing some twenty-five years. In the first revolution of 1905, the conspirators within the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) laid claim to the inheritance of the tsarist empire. In the second revolution of 1917, the radical politicians of its Bolshevik faction created a hybrid “nationality” state. In the “great transformation” after 1928, the Stalinists within the Politburo set out to modernize whole cultures and economies. They did all of this primarily by way of the Russian language, although sometimes in reciprocal relations with its neighboring languages, both of which were always woven into complex histories and policies. Through various advances and retreats, the Russian language displayed a unique resilience and strategic presence, growing stronger as an imperial relation.

The Russian Empire and Soviet Union, so this story teaches us, were never any one thing. Their power lay in their dynamism, their ability to forge uniformity through multiplicity: to be, or pretend to be, one thing and many other things. The empire began as multinational Russia (Rossiia), not as ethnic Russia (Rus”), though it depended on its ethnic core to survive and govern. Both empire and union were adept at what Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen have called: “multiple variantness” (mnogovariantnost’), which meant imposing “flexible, non-uniform, and inconsistent governance to accommodate the
coexistence of a multiplicity of social arrangements within a single state.” This was a “technology of ruling Russia” by way of “the simultaneous use of different registers for ruling different regions and different people.” In this imperial project, there was perhaps no more important, no more flexible and exploitative (and sometimes treacherous) register than language.

Russian state leaders owed part of their success to their use of words, specifically their application of the creative (and destructive) power of metaphor: a power of substitutions. By “substitutions” I mean several processes: first, how the USSR state inherited and “took the place” of the Russian Empire in both literal and figurative ways; second, how it co-opted and adapted the imperial “national problem” to revolutionary purposes; and third, how it exchanged more genuine nations for hybrid ones, displaced the national for more imperial aims. In all such ways, these leaders understood language as a “factor” (фактор) or technology of rule. They offered language rights to the various nationalities as a necessary and benevolent compromise, but ultimately only as a substitution for their own true civil societies and representative democracies. They conceded the existential functions and ontological forms of national languages, but without the participatory “idea” of the nation. Language was a means, not an end, the way of political calculation, not the sum of self-determination. To elucidate these trends, I propose a new interpretive semantics or “metaphorics” of Soviet power. This means investigating language politics and change through the actual words that state administrators used, that we still use today. After all, we always make all our substitutions in and through words. Their language factor, in this sense, remains our own.

The first substitution relates to legacies: how the Soviet Union deliberately took the place of the Russian Empire, primarily through the violent interventions of the revolution and civil war. A number of impressive studies have confirmed the continuity, with a wise comparative approach, weighing similarities and differences. We now better understand how both of these states commanded their nationality parts as agents or collaborators; or how they sought to civilize and modernize them, or alternately discipline and punish them; or how they both identified and named, counted, and described them. Both were “nationality states,” not nation-states on the French or German models, but more like the Habsburg multiethnic empire. These studies offer fresh new perspectives over time, breaking out of our isolating academic specialties, all to better recognize what was shared and what was not.

The risk of writing about legacies involves a question of scale, of course. Space defeats us, in the very size and scope of the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, as in the maps and charts we make of “its” languages or peoples, which
reproduce and reify the very relations of empire that we claim to objectively study. The process tends to magnify the Russian and minimize the “national,” a historiographical syndrome that locks our subjects and our arguments into center and peripheries, the one and the many, the big and the small. In studying the empire or union, we inevitably became imperial and statist too, enjoying all the prestige of the big, avoiding all the provincialism of the small.

We ought not to exaggerate influence. Reading backwards, the empire was not the union. Language helps us to spotlight the differences. The Russian Muscovite and imperial states were, in a sense, prepositional. We see this in the very place names of its expansion: always moving “toward” or “at” or “through” a series of geographical salients: the Pribaltika and Ukraina, the Zakavkaz and Povol’zhe. These were substitutions. We also see them in the very labels that the Tsarist state applied to the new peoples with whom it came into contact at its inner and outer edges: people “at that other land” (tuzetsy, or “outlanders”), people “of that other birth” (inorodtsy, or “aliens”). All of these terms were generics, substituting one name for many names, collapsing multiplicity into unity. Tsarist agents subjected the term inorodtsy to even more substitutions, a whole sweep of meanings. It was originally used by Moscow to describe the “little peoples” of Siberia, an estate of the realm owing service to it and deserving some privileges in return. But the term came to mean almost all of the small “minority” peoples inhabiting the Russian Empire. By the turn of the century, in a widening spiral of naming and self-reference, imperial agents and teachers, missionaries and nationality leaders, were all referring to the ethnic peoples of the western and eastern borderlands as “aliens.”

The geographical salients of inorodtsy were at the edges of the “ethnic Russian homeland” (koreennaia Rus’). Hence its self-representations as a great circular state, be it a city or principality, tsardom or empire. Leonid Gorizontov has framed the empire as a circle within a circle: the imperial Russian ethnic core at the Slavic homeland and the outer circle of its farthest expansion. Landscapes and ethnic types marked the boundaries, as for example where the forest ended and the steppes began, or where the Russian peasant morphed into the Kalmyk nomad. Language separated the circular frontiers as well, where even the Muscovite dialect standard lost its force at Kursk, where Russian speakers lost almost all comprehension among the Mari or Kazakhs. The infamous minister of the interior and russifier Petr Valuev saw the empire as just such a “circular” state (okruzhnost’), joined by the centripetal forces holding it together and the “centrifugal tendencies” constantly threatening it. To Gorizontov’s concentric pair, then, we ought to add hundreds of intersecting inner and outer circles: the city and countryside dialects within the Russian literary language (itself an overarching standard) and the many languages and dialects (both written and spoken) of the ethnic peoples within and just beyond the empire. In its spaces and sounds, Russian was a ringed state of rings.
Lines of Russification and nativization, of unification and differentiation, intersected these imperial circles. By the time of the first Russian revolution of 1905, the tsarist state had crafted and tested a variety of Russification policies. They began with a forward and patriotic “official nationality” after the Napoleonic wars and Nikolaevan regime of the early 1800s. They peaked with a coercive “Russification” (*obrušenie*), largely in reaction to local nationalisms (like Poland) and foreign threats (like Germany), after the 1860s. They evolved to a more conciliatory Russification toward the end of the empire. These are but three types. To be precise, we would need to multiply them by their times and places between the 1860s and 1910s, between the Baltics and Caucasus, Ukraine and Siberia, factoring in the strategies and tactics of any one policymaker in any given situation. From the imperial point of view, any of these Russifications needed to succeed just enough, at the right times, in the targeted places, to serve multivariant imperial interests. We would also be wrong to separate these strands, for the coercion enabled the conciliation, alternating prohibitions with accommodation, violence with recognition.

Russification had a very real presence in the literal lines of settlement into the western borderlands, into the Caucasus (the Mughan steppe), and into Central Asia and Siberia. The hundreds of thousands of “through-settlers” (*perešelentsy*, another prepositional) literally made their way into the borderlands of empire along steppes and rivers, highways and railroads, with state patronage and support, bringing the Russian language with them, or something close to it (in their hundreds of local dialects), simultaneously binding and loosening the Russian language along the way. The power and prestige of the Russian imperial state and its language also attracted a critical mass of nationality agents, often bilingual Polish, Baltic-German, or Armenian agents serving throughout the empire, who were bound to the system, out of fear or respect or a measure of both, and prospered enough from it all the way to the start of World War I.

The coercive variant of Russification (in the form of administrative decrees, prohibitions, censorships) was a function of the tsarist state’s sense of place and privilege for the “Great Russian” language and culture in a hierarchy of evolving languages; of its need to either divide or unite some of the languages and dialects beneath it, so as to guarantee its own priority. For the “autocracy” (*samoderžavnost’*) to retain its legitimacies and advantages at home and abroad, it needed to constantly affirm its “great power” (*velikoe derzhavnost’*) mentality and status. Yet many russifiers understood the practical need to compromise in some way with the ethnic particular in order to promote the ethnic universal (Russian). Nikolai Il’ininskii was the founder of one of the most prominent state-sponsored concessionary approaches, a system of religious conversion and education for the Volga-Urals peoples (the Mari and Chuvash) and eventually for the Kazakh too. His rivals applied a blunt “sound”
model of forcing spoken Russian upon these minority ethnic students. He based teaching on new phonetic Cyrillic alphabets, native-language primers and grammars, and cadres of native teachers. To truly possess a faith, to sense and know it as one’s own, required the sounds and signs of one’s own language. Teachers needed to reach students first in the native tongue, to diagram it as a lexical and grammatical foundation for learning Russian. The native was an essential conduit toward Russian, an imperative at the heart of later Soviet nationality policies as well.

Il’minski’s conciliatory methods were hardly impartial. He meant them to create a linguistic wedge within the Volga-Urals peoples and do battle with his great rival, the Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gasprinskii who had also mobilized linguistics and language teaching, but to bring the Turkic masses up to a new national language community of their own, under Tatar rather than Russian hegemony. His “new method” (usul-i jadid) was an initiative in linguistic democracy, to better match the teaching and printing of the Turkic languages (which were in a common Arabic script) to native phonetics—the actual sounds of speakers. Gasprinskii’s ultimate goal was to raise the masses, through their own dialects and languages, to a common “Turkic” (Turki). This goal floundered, though, as his best followers promoted local languages instead: Galimdzhan Ibragimov, for one, crafted a modified Arabic script for Kazan Tatar; M. A. Shahtakhtinskii, a modified Arabic script and even a new Latin alphabet for Azerbaijani.10

These latter linguistic methods were the foundations for a renaissance in national literary cultures at the turn of the century. They helped give rise to national political movements, fortified by the new manufacturing and commodity markets; the railroads, telegraph, and telephone lines; and the various print media (books and newspapers) that now crisscrossed European and Asian Russia. Thanks to all of these, the imperial salients were already becoming more like nation-states in formation. Just as the arcs of inorodtsy were expanding at the peripheries of empire, they seemed to explode into dozens of new national circles. The imperial census of 1897 recognized these trends. It set out to take a measure of the empire’s peoples and parts, but found it in some distress. The Ukrainian people, still counted as “Little Russians” (malorossy), who spoke what Russian linguists and politicians understood to be a constituent dialect of the “Great Russian language,” were rising in numbers and national consciousness. A variety of Muslim and mostly Turkic peoples were rising too, what imperial agents now paired as a “pan-Islamic” and “pan-Turkic” threat. The “Great Russians” (velikorossy), numbering but 43 percent of the total population, seemed besieged.11

The national, rather than the estate or confessional, was becoming the dominant mode of political discourse, as found in a number of venues: the political charters for autonomy and federalism during and after the 1905 revolution; and
the debates by nationality representatives in the Dumas between 1906 and 1911 for fuller democratic and national rights. The nationalities were engaged in what analysts of the time called “national construction” (natsional’noe stroitel’sto), meaning the “crystallization” and “differentiation” of new linguistic and national communities within the empire.

Yet the tsarist empire was not necessarily doomed by this trend. Educators and administrators understood that Russian imperial integration was failing in the Muslim “east” (Central Asia) thanks to an overwhelming language barrier. Most of its loyal “Russian Muslims” (russkie musul’mane) did not understand Russian. The empire needed to go deep. The solution was to bridge language communities with an educational system for the parallel learning of languages, not only with more individual translators but with a whole new culture of translation: reciprocal translations in the press and publications, along with native and Russian learning in the schools. Imperial agents now put their faith in a new kind of Russification policy: nationality “assimilation” (sblizhenie). This term suggested not forced identity or equivalence but a kind of functional uniformity, a drawing together centered on the native and the Russian language. It meant promoting the native language as the “single best conduit” to “unite the native tribes within the stream of all-Russian civilization.” One publicist discussed all of this in terms of a necessary “accommodation” (prisposoblenie) between the Russian state and its local peoples, to better integrate them into a “common home” (obshchezhitie), centered on the “gradual” and cooperative dissemination of the Russian language. The point was not “to make ethnic Russians” (russkie) but create new “inter-relations” between “civic Russians” (rossiiskie).

The radicals within the RSDLP and its Bolshevik nucleus were one unintended legacy of these imperial Russification policies. Even when tsarist agents applied either coercive or conciliatory policies to “assimilate” the nationalities, they undermined their very own purposes by turning their very own language of imperial rule into a language of opposition. The Bolsheviks not only inherited the broad results of Russification (though they took every opportunity to criticize them), they were its results. Their party was classically rossiiskaia, and they were in significant cases russified nationality representatives educated in the state-sponsored schools. Like other politicians, the Bolsheviks used their mastery of Russian to advance political agendas, speaking to each other and to ethnic Russians in an ideology that was “class universalist but Russian inflected”—in other words, “Russophone.” Yet they could also speak to their own national groups in their native languages, disseminating ideology and conspiracy along the way. These Bolshevik elites enjoyed this rare doubling power. After 1917, it was doubled again, from subversion within the empire to a new order among the Soviet territories. Yet for minority-nationality Bolsheviks, Russian was hardly a neutral means of communication. It was something
more detached and utilitarian, their way of learning the writings of Karl Marx or Charles Darwin, or the political idioms of Vladimir Lenin. The Russian language was their essential instrument of representation and eventually rule, a complex language of symbols, empowering the Bolsheviks as educated, mobile, and predatory. Their personal and professional trajectories were always away from the peripheries toward the center: russophone meant russophile and russocentric.

Two leading Bolsheviks, Vladimir Ulianov and Iosif Dzhugashvili, demand a bit more attention. We know them better as “Lenin” and “Stalin,” two more substitutions. Though their positions became dominant after 1917, at first their platforms were merely two variations upon a rich and vibrant political ground. Lenin’s ideas, for example, offer an enlightening comparison with the writings of the linguist and activist Jan Baudouin de Courtenay. For Lenin, born and raised into Russian, language was something simple, both personally and politically. It was essential and categorical, a reflection of the real world and therefore coincident and translatable with it. It was the most reliable means by which people identified themselves, and states marked them, in time and space. Hence: Lenin’s and Bolshevism’s preference for native-language rights within state “national-territorial autonomy.” For Baudouin, language was much more complex. It could be both wonderfully liberating and terribly confining. He warned against governments using language to measure and identify people, to mark and reduce them. In the multilingual and multiconfessional societies of the Russian Empire, it made better and fairer sense to locate language rights in individuals and small communities, not in state-recognized groups or whole territories. He was, therefore (following Otto Bauer and Karl Renner), an advocate of extra-territorial, “national-cultural autonomy” (if with some national-territorial options), meaning the rights of individuals to choose and use their own languages at will within a freer civic community.17 The spaces between Lenin and Baudouin matter. They spotlight a chasm between ideology and democracy.

Stalin’s own approach to the nationalities had its contemporary alternative in the writings and activities of Mammad Emin Resulzade, Azerbaijani social democrat and nationalist. Stalin’s “Marxism and the National Question” (1913) and Resulzade’s essays on nationalism (1913) matched well enough: defining the nation as a bond of language and ethnicity, community and territory, history and sometimes religion. Both valued language as the core component of the national, one of its central “terms” (cherty) and “signs” (priznaki). Both men were positioned squarely within the Russian Empire, seeking the grounds for a more liberal “national-territorial autonomy.” The Russian state was to become a democratic federal republic, what Resulzade called a new “building” (zdanie), an architecture of parts within which each nationality would find an honorable place (each in a “room” or komnata all its own). After the
Russian revolution of 1917, several of Stalin’s allies turned this metaphor into the infamous “communal apartment.” So, their words were almost the same. Yet the meanings and purposes were completely different. Stalin was already thinking from the center, about how to govern a new kind of state, dependent on language (Russian and non-Russian) as a tool or discrete “form” of the proletarian imperial. Resulzade was thinking forward about how to rule from an independent nation, with Azerbaijani Turkic as the marker of identity and destiny. For him, language was both the “external form and internal world” of the nation, a forum for the civic national.  

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The second substitution involves a question of surrogacies, the ways by which Soviet party-state leaders co-opted and reconfigured the “national question” for world revolution. World War I and the Russian revolution, culminating in the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, transformed the political landscapes, revealing the new mobilizing power of ethnicity and language: in armies, militias, and political parties on the ground; or in categories of enemy aliens; or in prisoners of war and in displaced persons. The ravages of military invasion and occupation drew Russians together in battlefront advances; or joined Poles and Ukrainians in defense and counterattack; or shaped Russians and Armenians in Christian alliance against the Muslim Turks. Politics now happened between combatants and besieged civilians who did not necessarily look or act the same but who usually spoke (or sometimes prayed) alike. Language was the medium that enabled a new politics of wartime ethnicity. 

The Bolsheviks inherited the empire’s mobilized ethnicities, along with its “root” or “radical problems” (korennye voprosy): problems with women and with peasants, with religious and with nationality groups, and how to better integrate them into public life. But the Bolsheviks also refitted these problems for the Russian and world revolutions. Hence Stalin’s rather strange formula of equivalences, really a set of substitutions: “the peasant question is a national question is a colonial question.” This ideological formula predicated Bolshevik success upon several broad initiatives. One was to turn “backward” (otstalye) peasants into modern Russians, to reach out to the alien “locale” (mest´) and bring it closer to the center (tsentr). Another initiative was to gradually assimilate the “backward” nationalities into a modernist all-Russian culture, to draw the rural “borderlands” (okraina) closer to the center. A third initiative, dependent on the success of the first two, was to promote revolution abroad, especially in the colonial east, where the oppressed rural and ethnic masses were also readying for revolution. All of these new agents of historical change were surrogates for the absent Russian proletariat, of course, and helped to turn their spokesman, Stalin, into Lenin’s ultimate surrogate and successor.
The first Soviet state, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), was not an empire, by its own definition. But it was still “civic Russian” (rossiiskaia), and in its federal structure was initially composed of the empire’s provincial units, eventually also composed of nationality autonomous republics and regions (the Tatar-Bashkir was the first in 1918), and with all varieties of recognized “national minorities” (natsional’nye menshinstva), each with formal and attractive rights for “native language” (rodnoi iazyk) development. As liberal and progressive as these initiatives might seem, they were little more than a return to the status quo ante bellum: to the late imperial calls for some kind of autonomous federalism and consensual assimilation to revive the Russian state.

The novelty of this new Russia was in its most creative territorial and linguistic substitutions. The tsarist empire, we have seen, was prepositional (geographic, rounded, and dynamic). The RSFSR was more nominal and appositional (constitutional, squared, and static). It was defined by its formalities and forms, by nouns bearing names (nominals) and by accompanying nouns renaming them (appositionals): Russian, soviet and federated, socialist and republic. I spotlight the RSFSR—reduced to its own stub, eresefeser by popular usage, another substitution—because it came first in 1918. It was the inspiration for renaming the Bolshevik Party as the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (RKP[b]), yet another substitution. It was what the new regime and Red Army killed and died for in the civil war. The RSFSR was also the model for how the coming Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or eseseser) organized its federal parts and wholes, its lesser and better portions. Its People’s Commissariat for the Nationalities (Narkomnats), a government body that was administrative rather than deliberative, was the model for the larger and equally bureaucratic USSR Nationalities Council of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK).

The Azerbaijani case is again instructive. For a short time, concurrent with the first years of the RSFSR, an independent republic ruled there: the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (ADR, 1918–20). We tend to read the sovereign states of the civil war period as counterfactuals, somehow comical or false, beset by anarchy. Yet they were real alternatives, either lived or promised. The ADR’s promotions of the Azerbaijani language in the government, media, and schools, defined as “turkification” (tiurkifikatsiia), with the goal of reducing Russian to merely one of a number of foreign languages, were revolutionary possibilities compared to the later Soviet model. Azerbaijani leaders also sought to create a genuine linguistic democracy, joining the free word with the idea of a free nation, centered on civic participation and pluralism. Resulzade called this a political system “synonymous” with its own peoples. The national was about being, not about seeming.

When the Bolshevik regime and the Red Army invaded and occupied the
country in April 1920, they overthrew a legitimate government and established a new proxy regime: the Azerbaijani “Soviet Socialist Republic” (azeseser), the first of its kind in a longer line to come. It was independent de jure, but locked by treaty and de facto control to the RSFSR, soon folded into the new USSR state, and for a time into the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (teeseseser). Within its “jurisdiction” (like other union and autonomous republics) were the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous “Region” and even a Kurdistanskii “District,” along with hundreds of lesser councils and villages and schools for Armenian, Lezgin, and Talysh “national minorities.” The new state also enjoyed its very own Azerbaijani Communist Party of Bolsheviks (AKP[b]), by form independent but in reality ruled from the Transcaucasus Regional Committee (Zakraikom) of the RKP(b), under Sergei Kirov’s local lead, Moscow’s man in Baku.

What a dizzying new hierarchy of toponyms from above, all to replace Resulzade’s “synonym” from below. There was something almost magical to all of this, as if the Soviet regime could simply name places and people into existence, objects of pure form, each with its own acronym. With the RSFSR and USSR, with the RKP(b) and its affiliates, and with all these place names, we are certainly not in the Russian Empire anymore. But we are still very much in the imperial, in a new and complex Soviet set of imperial relations. It amounted to a complex process of naming, of identification and categorization, of locking places and people into sets and subsets of other places and people. The empire of substitutions was by necessity an empire of repetitions, bound to the very multiple nationalities around ethnic Russia. But in all these cases, the national was descriptive more than constitutive.

Closely related to these new formal names were a series of generic labels or hypernyms for the nationalities, terms that gathered the many into one and turned multiplicitics into unities. We might also call them false universals, unities that only made sense in the isolated imperial universe of the USSR. For example, party and state leaders replaced the negative “aliens” (inorodtsy) with a more neutral “other nationalities” (inonatsional’nosti) by 1921, the preferred term of use into the 1930s. It matched better with the new constitutional metaphor of the Soviet regime as a “socialist fatherland,” one that gave birth to a new “family” (rod) or “brotherhood” of peoples, a staple of Bolshevik liberation ideology. The People’s Commissariat of Education (Narkompros RSFSR) also created a fascinating new catch-all label, “people of the non-Russian language” (narody nerusskogo iazyka), soon reduced to the all-inclusive and manageable “non-Russians” (nerusskie). These terms were meant to be neutral and objective. Yet they collapsed variety and autonomy under state control.

There was also a constant trend to the diminutive and pejorative. Soviet publicists invented an efficient if rather insulting shorthand: “natslangs” (nats-
iazyki) for the nationality languages, “bashlang” (bashiazyk) for the Bashkir language, or kir’iazyk for Kirgiz, and dagiazyki for the many languages of Dagestan. Terms like the “national throngs” (natsional’nye nizi) or the “locals” (mestnie) were common. The category “national minorities” (natsional’nye menshinstva) referred to a specific kind of non-Russian, someone living in a larger majority-nationality territory, though publicists often used it to refer to any non-Russian anywhere, enough to eventually become the common and derogatory natsmen.23 Publicists often referred to the nationalities as “outlanders” (tuzemtsy). In one article alone, for example, we can read of the “outlander population,” and the “outlander working masses,” and the “outlander half-proletarian masses.”24 It was as if the writer was drawing from a nomenclature system of interchangeable parts. In moments of stress and hatred, Russians could also call up any of a number of terms of abuse, racial slurs uttered under one’s breath or behind the scenes, though never in print.

Beyond these names, another older usage became more widespread: the nominalization of verbal forms, especially by joining a noun (often a foreign word) with the suffix “ization” (-izatsiya). The Russian Revolution saw a flood of these forms in the official idiom (party and state documents and the media): terms like intesifikatsiya, proletarizatsiya, and sovetizatsiya. They were part of broader Soviet preference for nominalizations in syntax, all to lock readers and listeners into fixed ideological meanings, accentuating conformity, inevitability, and the totality of completion.25 In early nationality policy, the favorite term of use was “nationalization” (natsionalizatsiya), or more particularly such derivatives as Ukrainization or Tatarization or Uzbekification. These meant the promotion of native languages in the schools and media, as well as the promotion of nationality representatives into the Soviet party and state administration.

Democratic in principle, nationalization was hardly so in practice. Often it was more about reducing rather than raising the nation, as in the case of what was called the “differentiation” (differentsiatsiya) of the dialect groups and class strata within a national language community. This was all about demarcating the lower working classes in national life, along with their popular dialects, and distinguishing them as new party and state cadres, against the established “nationalist bourgeoisie.”26 Once differentiated, the Soviet regime marshaled these communities for the “realization” (realizatsiya) of their native languages in national life. This term, which dated back to the bureaucratic initiatives of the Great Reforms of the 1860s, meant preparing these cadres for the apparat, through education in the schools and through promotion into the workplace. “Realization” of a language demanded the parallel “translation” (perevod) of administrative “paperwork” (deloproizvodstvo) from the Russian into the native language (and sometimes back again). It meant relegating the nationality language to files and folders.27 Both “differentiation” and “realiza-
tion” had less to do with democracy, and more with the new demography of identifying and counting both social and national groupings. These were terms of administrative practice, not self-government.

The Narkompros RSFSR was essential in these processes of nationalization, differentiation, and realization. Its scholars and linguists were responsible for earmarking the lower dialects for promotion in scripts and grammars, the schools and print cultures. Its administrators and educators created the curriculums for language education, often defined as the “differential method” and “comparative approach,” meaning a calibrated stratagem as to when and how to transfer instruction from the native language to Russian. These policies established the national languages in the grade schools and media outlets, but never beyond a certain ceiling. The native language, in essence, was often little more than a vehicle (or temporary substitution) for eventual proficiency in Russian. Narkompros was also notorious, in one of the most significant substitutions of them all, for defining educational and cultural policies not just for the RSFSR but for the whole USSR. The sources reveal a constant blending and mixing of the two states: for example, administrators applied blanket terms like the “national borderlands” (natsional’nye okrany) or “natsregions of the Soviet East” (natsraionakh Sovetskogo Vostoka) in referring to all non-Russian territories everywhere. Such terms made no sense, of course, outside of the imperial universe of the USSR.

Amid all of these appositionals and nominals, the regime also revived a new kind of prepositional power, much more forceful than anything late imperial agents ever attempted. Bolshevik ideologues now applied the perfective aspect in Russian grammar, joining prepositions to verbs of motion, in a variety of essential terms: “involvement” (vovlechenie), “attraction” (privlechenie), “drawing together” (priblizhenie), “assimilation” (sblizhenie), “absorption” (vtiagovanie) and “promotion” (vydvizhenie). These were signal terms bridging the earliest years of Soviet power with the later years of the Stalinist “great transformation.” They threaded political manifestos and party transcripts, educational tracts and newspaper articles. The prepositions and perfective aspects in these nouns were the perfect expressions of the Soviet regime’s ideological mission for the nationalities, of its mobilizing power and reach. They were meant to unite the peripheries and their peoples to the Soviet state apparatus, to the Russian proletariat, to Moscow’s control. They represented intransigent expectations and inevitable outcomes. They were a new grammar of transformative change, metaphors about the certainty of state unification in space and over time. At times, for the fullest effect, writers even joined the perfective aspect with the nominalized verb, as in the case of the demand for the “drawing together [priblizhenie] of the state apparatus to the local population by way of the realization [realizatsiia] of the native language.” Such phrases offered no choices, only predetermined results. They comprised an idiom of patronage and benevolence, not independence and self-determination.
We can return to Azerbaijan to survey some of the effects of these policies and to remind us of how people experienced them on the ground in their very lives. Here, as in other parts of the USSR, the majorities of ethnic peoples always spoke their native languages through these years. The national language remained a latent, cultural-intellectual capital: in how people talked as before; or in how they represented their speech in new alphabets and grammars and the most basic of print cultures. Yet in Aidyn Balaev’s judicious perspective, we are still dealing with negatives and absences. The native language was under the constant pressure of shortage and meager result. The Azerbaijani literary language failed to develop along more natural paths, lost its Persian and Turkic words, and acquired Russian ones, turning it into something less than truly Azerbaijani. Moscow deprived the language community of genuine national leaders, of fuller truth in a free press and creative literature. The native language became a threadbare currency, good only locally: in homes and schools, in provincial towns and rural areas, in departments of languages and literatures. The Russian language, on the other hand, became a currency of considerable value, enjoying a prestige without limits, good everywhere in the USSR and among all people who knew it. Russian enjoyed the inherent value of the singular, of the above and in between, as against the plurality and equality of everything else “not Russian” (нерусский).

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The third substitution points to a series of dependencies, how already in the “liberal” 1920s, an imperial Soviet power superseded the national parts within it. The Azerbaijani case study again offers perspective. Beginning in 1923, the very year that Soviet “national policy” premiered on the political stage, the communist party launched two focused attacks against the national-communist leaders Nariman Narimanov and Eyyub Khanbudagov as purveyors of national “deviations” (уклон). These campaigns were closely related to the attack on the Kazan Tatar communist Mir Said Sultan Galiev, who had leveraged his own “national” leadership over the anticolonial revolution in the “east.” Each of these men now named and criticized Moscow’s nationality policies as something false, as substitutions, and little more than screens for central control: “nationalization” as a kind of Russification. The Azerbaijani SSR was not a center of its own, Narimanov argued, but remained a periphery to Moscow, especially under Stalin’s and Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s russifying policies. Khanbudagov spotlighted how the “natives” were so poorly represented in meaningful educational, management, and governmental roles. Both understood that the Nationalities Council of TsIK, or that nationality territories and native-language concessions (тируфикацiiia), did not make the “nation.” The idea and practice of a nation mattered. True revolutionary progress meant the self-determination and sovereignty of its speakers.
These critiques of early Soviet nationality policies may have found their most poignant confirmation in an unlikely place: the state policy of “indigenization” (korenizatsiia) that gradually replaced nationalization into the later 1920s, with full effect in the cultural revolution and the policies of collectivization and industrialization after 1928. Scholars tend to use korenizatsiia retrospectively, to mean the linguistic and administrative policies of the very early 1920s, or even the whole seventy years of the Soviet regime. The term underlies the elegant multilingual maps of the USSR, or its orderly charts of nationality territories. It frames the USSR as that neutral and hopeful “state of nations” founded in the early 1920s and revived in the later 1950s. Yet in its origins and most significant meanings, korenizatsiia is a rather small and confining term. The best evidence reveals, as Terry Martin first noted, that it came into widespread use only in the later 1920s. We will never be able to find the very first spoken use of the term; that will remain one of language’s great mysteries. But I have found at least one of its first public uses in October of 1926, in the leading journal of the Soviet state administration, appropriately titled Soviet Power (Vlast’ sovetov). Bureaucrats derived it from an imperial administrative phrase, the “native population” (korennoe naselenie), first applied to the “little” Siberian tribes but expanded under Soviet bureaucrats to all ethnic groups. It was a tsarist throwback, referring to these distant peoples as indigene, objects of political promotion and assimilation, or of academic study, something like the aborigines of Australia or the Amazon. When we use the term, especially in its anthropological sense as “indigenization,” we replicate this Russian statism and orientalism, we diminish the nationalities. In our own act of substitution, we take the part, korenizatsiia, for the whole, Soviet nationality policy.

Sometime in the middle 1920s, some unknown Soviet state bureaucrat decided to marry the adjective, korennoe, to the verbal suffix, izatsiia, to coin the new term, korenizatsiia. True, it had a neutral, objective sensibility. It certainly sounded better than, say, tuzemnizatsiia. But it was also one more in a series of generic labels that the Soviet regime applied to its plural nationalities. It was also a convenient bureaucratic substitute for “nationalization,” a perfect euphemism to mean less, not more nationalization; and more, not less centralization of efforts. It signaled the institutionalization of the nationalities in the routine of the apparat rather than any elaboration of national or local interests. Korenizatsiia threaded state power downward as it raised select natives upward: it was the “work of nativizing the Soviet apparatus and drawing it toward the native population” (v dele korenizatsii sovapprarat i priblijzeniia ego k korennomu naseleniui); and the “promotion of workers from the sphere of the native population” (vydvizhenie rabotnikov iz sredy korennogo naseleniia). As a neologism, so one observer noted, the term was at first strange and “cutting to the ear.” It had an artificial and foreign ring. But over the years, between 1926 and 1933, the term was disseminated in ever wider circles out of
the state bureaucracy and into media outlets and public conversations. Communist ideologues had to teach the term to their own cadres. They wrote of “so-called korenizatsiia”; or affixed it as the “natsionalizatsiia (korenizatsiia)” of the party and state apparatuses; or translated it as a “bolshevization.” But once this learning process was complete, korenizatsiia became a favorite term of party discourse, especially as a complement to collectivization and industrialization, to “tractorization” and “passportization,” to the “liquidation” (of the kulaks) and the “signalization” (of party doctrine). These were all projects out to reengineer all-Russian society in “radical ways” (korennym obrazom), make a “radical break” (koreennaia lomka) with the past, and lead to “radical socialist reconstruction” (korennoes sotsialisticheskoe pereustroistvo). Korenizatsiia was therefore a new kind of nationalization, one suited to the Stalinist great transformation, implying a radicalization of the local non-Russian rank and file, by way of Bolshevik ideology.

As a signal to prepare Stalinist cadres for modernization, korenizatsiia meant creating a new generation of translators, young people proficient in both the native and Russian languages. By birth and place they were local residents of an assigned nationality, native speakers of the native language. Their preferred name was “promotees” (vydvizhentsy), though they were also called “communist nationals” and “worker nationals,” the “national” signifying the native language they spoke and used at work. They were to represent the local population in the “lower apparat” (village soviets, cooperatives, grade schools, and collective farms), registering items such as births and marriages and deaths, or the receipt and payment of loans, or the organization of civil suits. They were to disseminate communist ideology yet also to act as “barometers” of the popular mood (one of Stalin’s terms). But by status and purpose they also had to be bilingual. Their essential task was to master “parallel” administrative paperwork in both the native and the Russian language, or what was often called “universal technical literacy” (vseobshchaia tekhnicheskaia gramotnost”). Korenizatsiia, in these terms, was a nativization for Russification. Or as one writer put it rather heftily, the new times demanded the “nativization of the Soviet apparatus by way of the involvement [vovlechenie] of the working masses of the formerly backward nationalities in the management of the Soviet state.”

If this policy of korenizatsiia was a rooting of the party-state into the lives of local people and their languages, a radicalization of their cultures and economies, it was also a kind of uprooting, a play on one meaning of “to root” (korenit’)—in other words “to root out.” There was no korenizatsiia without a displacement, without the eradication of the old national bourgeoisie, and their dialects and print cultures, in favor of the new Soviet promotees. Korenizatsiia was always about replacing the old independent national elites with new dependent Soviet ones. In these ways, it was also closely related to the Soviet policy of the “latinization” (latinizatsiia) of the Arabic alphabets for
the people of the “east.” Both were a “policy” (politika) meant to create new literate cadres and print cultures, based on new alphabets, orthographies, lexicons, and grammars, all aligned to the actual sounds and speech patterns of most speakers. But both were also a “politics” (politika) which demanded the “displacement” (vytesnenie) of rival national literary and political elites in the process.\(^{41}\) Latin meant reducing the masses to a new autonomy, a new literary regime with alphabet primers, textbooks, schools, and newspapers, but without the treasury of Arabic-script literature. That autonomy also made them liable to Soviet ideological commands.

Both korenizatsiya and latinizatsiya highlight the relegation of the national language to an instrumental “factor” in Soviet politics, rather than as a forum for genuine national sovereignty. Leading party and state administrators made this point time and again. The veteran Narkomnats and TsIK executive I. Arkhincheev cautioned that latinization (like the national language) was “not a goal or end in itself but a means, a tool, a method” (ne tsel’ ili samotsel’, a sredstvo, orudie, metod), in other words “the most important factor” (krupneishii faktor) in Soviet nationality policy. “The native language is not an end in itself,” wrote I. D. Davydov, director of the Council of National Minorities (Narkompros). It was merely a “pedagogical principle.” Or as G. Togzhanov, a Kazakh national-communist, wrote: neither language nor alphabet were “ends in themselves,” but rather means for the “initiation” (priobshchenie) of non-Russians into the Russian language community, the font of “proletarian all-international culture.”\(^{42}\)

In all of these ways, both korenizatsiya and latinizatsiya were utilitarian “grammars” of a kind; means by which the Soviet regime translated its political, economic, and cultural power into the nationality peripheries. I mean grammar in a literal sense: small worlds of representations and rules that governed the usages of these terms and all their verbal constructions. D. N. Ushakov’s Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language (1935) even offered a small grammar lesson for korenizatsiya, explaining how to decline and properly use it in a sentence.\(^{43}\) But I also mean grammar in a figurative sense: as a political grammar, relating to a whole set of people and things, subject to well-defined and controlling regulations and techniques. Korenizatsiya and latinizatsiya represented language as a technology of rule, a mechanism of power.

These terms were also precedents for two powerful means of forced Russification in the later 1930s: the standardization of terminologies and literary languages under a Russian standard; and the conversion of all Soviet alphabets (except Georgian and Armenian) to Cyrillic bases. Here were the ultimate kinds of imperial translation: as identification with and transliteration from Russian. However static and squared in its appositions and toponyms, the Soviet Union still yet expressed a dynamism and mobilizational power by way of korenizatsiya, latinizatsiya, standardizatsiya, and kirillizatsiya. Here was
a supreme confidence that language could be known and manipulated; that the vastly different forms of languages, in their lexicons and grammars, were nonetheless mutually intelligible in translations, part of a universal stock of meanings ordained by history, and by Marx and Engels, by Lenin and Stalin.\textsuperscript{44}

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By the early 1930s, through all of these varied contexts, centered on an “empire of substitutions,” the Soviet Union had become less of a serene multilingual state and more of a regime of forced bilingualisms—without choice or full reciprocity. Multilingual, yes: but only in the sense of forced bilingualism multiplied by the Soviet Union’s various parts; multilingualism as the sum of its many smallish parts. In the end, all of its substitutions—as legacies, or surrogacies, or dependencies—may add up to one overarching substitution: the Soviet state as a massive project of translation. It was a \textit{translatio imperii}, a “transfer” of rule from one empire to another. But its founders also created a powerful metaphor of \textit{traditio imperii}, a “translation” or “duplication” (duplicity) within the empire, an interdiction between the languages of empire. It was, in effect, a massive project of discrete translations. This implied an equality of languages, as all translation does. This assumed a mutual give and take, a transferring and giving up of words and meanings. But this also all added up to a loss and a gain, a translation for Russian. Both the tsarist and Soviet states wielded the creative and destructive power of prepositionals and appositionals, of generics and hypernyms: moving and occupying places and peoples by way of territories, by way of languages.

We are left with a surprising paradox: Soviet “nations” were less genuine thanks to Soviet language policies, which raised them to some linguistic autonomy and self-representation, while at the same time denying them political sovereignty and self-determination. The language factor and its linguistic markers helped Soviet nations seem legitimate, but only seem so. A whole set of other factors intervened: the protocols of the Communist Party, the pseudo-constitutional strictures of the Soviet state, the economic demands of collectivization and industrialization—all in and through the Russian language.

Notes

3. See, for example, Juliette Cadiot, \textit{Le laboratoire imperial: Russie-URSS, 1860–1940}


22. For these terms, see Stalin’s usages in *Marksizm i natcional’no-koloniul’nyi vopros*, 70; *Desiatyi s’ezd RKP(b)*, 212; and *Dvenadtsatyi s’ezd RKP(b)* 17–25 aprelia 1923 goda (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1968), 493. Also see Narkomnats, *Politika sovetskoi vlasti po natsional’nomu voprosu za tri goda* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1920), 156–57.


30. For *voylechenie*, for example, see Stalin’s comments in *Desiatyi s’ezd RKP(b)*, 211–14; as well as *Sovetskoe stroitel’stvo* 1 (1925): 185; and *Revolutsionnyi vostok* 11–12 (1931): 173.

31. On the meanings of the perfective aspect, see Laura Janda, “A Metaphor in Search


40. Quoted from *Revoliutsionnyi vostok* 3–4 (1932): 13; and also see 11–12 (1931): 216; and 1 (1933): 48.


42. See Arkhincheev’s quote in *Bolshevik* 11 (15 June 1928): 64–69; and 13 (15 July 1930): 79–85; as well as *Revolutsiiia i natsional’nost’* 7 (1930): 94. Davydov’s and Togzhanov’s claims are in *Prosveshchenie natsional’noste* 1 (1933): 9; and 3–4 (1933): 47.


44. For a culminating scholarly survey of these processes, see V. M. Zhirmunskii, *Natsional’nyi iazyk i sotsial’nye dialekty* (Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1936).