Cinema for the “Soviet East”: National Fact and Revolutionary Fiction in Early Azerbaijani Film

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Before the eyes of the vast, ignorant masses of the eastern nationalities, the fast-moving frames of cinema will reproduce the many achievements of human knowledge. For the illiterate audience, the electric beam of the magic motion-picture lamp will define new concepts and images, will make the wealth of knowledge more easily accessible to the backward mind.

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Pictures, so the first Bolsheviks believed, speak louder than words. Visual propaganda was essential in their campaign to reach the illiterate and poorly literate masses, to engage them in a new Soviet style of life. By the end of the civil war, every leading member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party valued the political uses of film. As commissar of nationalities, Iosef Stalin recognized its potential; in his simple expression, film was “the greatest means of mass agitation.” Like cinema, the Bolsheviks appeared at the confluence of two worlds, the traditional and the modern. For them, film was the perfect medium by which to critique the old and celebrate the new. Film viewed the world as they did, with one measure of hard realism, another of soft utopianism. Through montage, a movie could concentrate experience in a manageable time frame and unify story and spectacle, freezing life for display and dissection at a moment of traumatic

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social change. Movies attracted audiences by constructing worlds of seemingly factual truth, worlds of a stable and fixed reality. Cinematographers promised that film would “pry apart and expose all facets of reality without deception” and “depict the mutability of all phenomena through time and space.” This made film an important teaching tool, “a powerful lever for creating an elemental new culture.” Film delivered a double punch of realism, combining photographic certainty with narrative force, predicating history upon the perfect illusions of the moving picture.

Films, therefore, did not simply represent reality as it was, but recreated it as the Bolsheviks thought it ought to be, as “revolutionary romanticism” or “socialist realism,” replete with positive heroes, master plots, and the supreme value of “party allegiance” (party allegiance). The medium and message were perhaps most important in the multilingual borderlands of the “Soviet east,” where Bolshevik words (first and foremost in Russian) lost their power of communication and command. The “east” referred to the predominantly Muslim Caucasus and Central Asia, along with Siberia and the Far East. Georgia and Armenia, as westernized, Christian nations, were usually exempt from the category. Nariman Narimanov, a leading Azerbaijani Bolshevik, put it most bluntly when he wrote that, “in the east, where people are accustomed to thinking not by logical reasoning but by images, cinema is the single most powerful means of mass propaganda.” For the “dark” and “backward” peoples at Russia’s frontier with Asia, film became a mind-altering medium, the virtual reality of the early twentieth century. Cinematic socialist realism would show these peoples the way to the future, but not without first revealing to them the horrors of their own past and present. For there was a darker underside to the socialist realist equation, a style I call “national realism.” It spotlighted the shadowy world of traditional “everyday life” (byl) and


5. Narimanov, quoted from E. A. Kulibekov, Kinoiskusstvo Azerbaidzhana (Baku, 1960), 9–10. Nariman Narimanov (1870–1925) was a major figure in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party before and during the revolution, namely as a leader of the Azeri-Turk ‘Gummet’ (Endeavor) faction; afterward, he served in several top administrative posts in the Azerbaijani and Russian Soviet governments.
the archaic “popular mentality” (narodnost’), creating a colorful backdrop of national facts and “local color” (kolorit) to better screen the abstract communist future. National realism and socialist realism became the negative and positive poles of Soviet film. The east became a stage where the old world fought with the new, where tradition gave way to modernity, where Bolshevik fictions about class, religion, and gender converged in the making of a revolutionary culture.

But what exactly was the status of the “national” within this historical trajectory? This article charts the realist style in national film as a distinct orientalist approach to the Soviet east, a cultural imperialism embodying the classical distinctions of Edward Said’s analysis. Rather than reflect local realities, national realism tended more to project condescending ethnic prejudices onto the screen. In aesthetic terms, it meant deconstructing the national borderlands into a body of typical scenes, settings, and characters. Cameras spanned the wild, open spaces of the steppe and the Caucasus mountains; or the plowed fields and dilapidated mosques of Turkic villages; or the quaint historic monuments of Baku and Samarkand. Stories were set within backward Muslim society, governed by uncleanness, ignorance, superstition, and brutality. Characters were simply a function of their setting. The most memorable were as primitive and instinctual as the nature around them: fanatical clerics guided by human lusts rather than faith; despotic beks driven by greed and power rather than justice; women and children made helpless by both.

In the early years, these themes were the superficial products of traditional European orientalism, Russian style. “Oriental exotica,” driven by popular market demand, dominated the film industry. By the mid-1920s, party ideologists began to legitimate and perpetuate these themes as the aesthetic component of the Communist Party’s line in nationality policy. Filmmakers fused national settings with socialist plots much as the party merged “national forms” with “proletarian content,” a political formula that Stalin announced in 1925 and that presumed to balance ethnic territorialism with party centralism in the federal USSR state. The effect was to highlight just how doomed na-

6. I use the problematic term narodnost’ to mean those traditional cultural values of village or national life that, in the perspective of socialist realism, are worthy of assimilating into the proletarian culture of the future, along the “dialectic” from “spontaneity to consciousness.” See the discussions in Robin, Socialist Realism, 51–55; Clark, Soviet Novel, 84; and C. V. James, Soviet Socialist Realism: Origins and Theory (New York, 1973).


tional forms were within the unfolding dialectic of Soviet communism and its “union of the eastern peasantry with the Russian proletariat.” The old ethnic prejudices gave way to a chauvinistic Marxism, by its very ideology predisposed against the undeveloped east. National real-

isim reduced the eastern peoples to ethnographic and folkloric ma-
terial, cardboard scenery easily wheeled into or out of the live revolu-
tional drama. National facts dissolved into the fictional story lines of the Russian revolution. The eastern peoples could never hope to act on their own in the world, but only be acted upon by it. Change always came from the outside, the seeds of consciousness planted by progressive, Russian authority. More than just an approach, then, cin-
ematic national realism became one of Moscow’s preferred political means of engaging the east, dominating it, conquering it through cul-
tural hegemony.

Azerbaijan was the place to start, and Baku was a city the Bolsheviks could understand. At the turn of the century, it was the center of the nascent petroleum industry, more a wild frontier town than a sleepy port of call on the Caspian Sea. Thousands of “Europeans” (Slavs, Jews, Armenians, and Georgians), as well as Caucasian and Iranian Muslims, flocked there to make a living, maybe even their fortunes. Their dreams and perils were narrated in Baku’s first feature film, Oil and Its Millions Are My Masters (V tsarstve nefti i millionov, 1916). Based upon the short story written by the popular journalist, Ibragim Musabekov, the film dramatized the story of a poor Muslim boy who by a combination of wit and good fortune exchanged his rags for the riches of an oil million.

aire. But with perfect dramatic pitch he lost his soul in the process. This was a timely production for oil-rich Baku, and one typical of other Russian productions of the day which moralized on the pleasures and pains, hopes and despairs, of modern life. The Bolsheviks went to Baku too, if for a different kind of fortune. Their revolutionary underground became a school for the likes of Stalin, Sergo Ordzhoni-

kidze, Anastasi Mikoian, Sergei Kirov, and Lavrentii Beria. Baku was


10. Hereafter, I will use the term European in this same sense, to refer to any non-

Muslim living or working in the Muslim Caucasus and Central Asia. Starring a beloved actor and progressive thinker from the Baku theater, Gusein Arablinskii, and appearing in both Russian titles and Azeri-Turkic titles, the film was a hit. The leading folk musicians of Baku—Dzhabbar, Kurba, and Gulu—performed live at the premiers. To accommodate religious sensibilities, movie houses offered separate seatings and view-
their: urban, industrial, and cosmopolitan. By the time the Red Army marched into the city in late April of 1920, after a few years of shaky independence under the “Democratic Republic,” Azerbaijani Turks were a minority in their own capital, most of them desperately poor and uneducated, still tied to their native villages. They were a small island in Baku, and Baku was a small island of Europe in a sea of Muslim Azerbaijan.11

This unique ethnic and social diversity, which reduced the native population to a vulnerable minority in the capital and a malleable majority beyond, made the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) a perfect staging ground for the integration of the non-Russian territories of the USSR into the mainstream of a new Soviet culture. If the Bolsheviks could successfully undermine the power of Islam and modernize social values in everyday Azerbaijani life, then they might also present the country as a shining example of revolutionary achievement. They made these points unequivocally clear at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East (Baku, September 1920), one of the most photographed and publicized events of the civil war period. Here they strategically aligned the principles of national and colonial revolution: to raise up the oppressed peoples of the old Russian empire meant to raise them up everywhere in Asia. Troubled by the delay of revolution in western Europe, the Bolsheviks turned east, experiencing what one leading historian has called an “‘orientalization’ of Marxism.” In the lavish spectacles of the congress, decorated with the ornaments of Russian communism and the traditional costumes of the “orient,” the Bolsheviks lay down the challenge of colonial revolution before the trembling empires of Europe. Baku, standing at the “frontiers of Muslimdom,” became their “gateway to the east.”12 In turn, Azerbaijani cinema (Azerkino) became the vanguard in what V. I. Lenin called the “cinefication of the east,” which eventually encompassed the work of “Eastern Cinema” (Vostokkino) in the RSFSR and the republican film industries in Central Asia. The accent at the Baku congress and in these new cinema industries was less on the national, more on the colonial. Azerbaijani, for example, never made a movie about Azerbaijani nation building. Cinema became a vehicle, not to raise nations up to self-rule, but to spread Bolshevik power, values, and propaganda out-


ward to the Asian parts of the empire. Ideology counted more than independence. 13

Like other national cinemas, Azerkino’s first productions were factual documentaries; yet even they were implicated in the orientalist paradigm. Among the most heralded were newsreels of the Red Army marching into Baku, or chronicles like Travels in Azerbaijan, The Struggle against Locusts, and The First Congress of the People of the East. 14 These were the trophy films of the revolution and civil war on the national peripheries. They gave material proof that the far horizons of the Russian-Soviet domain, scenes of dramatic struggle and great hope, were once again whole. Narimanov first recognized the inherent chauvinism of these films when he commented on the official postcard photographs of the Baku Congress, which displayed the peoples of the east in “all kinds of poses,” outfitted with all the hackneyed military garb—the mountain caps, turbans, revolvers, sabers (kinzhali), and cartridge belts (shashki)—of a swashbuckling adventure movie. He joked that the western public would certainly look upon such pathetic figures, stock types in Europe’s own images of the east, and understand that the Bolsheviks staged only a quaint show, not a great threat, to Europe’s remaining colonial interests in Asia. Narimanov’s remarks were telling. They came amid the Bolshevik party’s first concerted purge of national-communist deviations throughout the RSFSR and its satellite states, purges that counted Narimanov and some of his own countrymen as victims. 15 In deciding who would rule over whom, the party also decided who would define whom. Who would shape the national imagination in public discourse and popular culture. At the dawn of


14. On the birth of national film as photographic documentary, see L. Kh. Mamatova, Mnogonatsional’noe sovetskoe kino-iskusstvo (Moscow, 1982), 7; Istoriia sovetskogo kino, 1:713–20; and M. Z. Rzaeva, Dokumental’noe kino Azerbaidzhana (Baku, 1971).

15. Quoted from Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv politicheskikh partii i obschestvennykh dvizhenii Azerbaidzhanskoj respubliki (GAPPOD) f. 609, op. 1, d. 119 (Narimanov’s top-secret report, “Toward a History of Our Revolution in the Borderlands,” presented to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and comrade Stalin, December 1923), l. 12. In this report, Narimanov lashed out at Moscow’s resiling elites in Azerbaijan. For background on the national purges of these years, see Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, 1992), 122–24; and Stephen Blank, “Stalin’s First Victim: The Trial of Sultangaliev,” Russian History 17, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 155–78.
the Soviet era, we find a most interesting convergence of forces. As the Communist Party experienced its turn to “orientalization,” it came to rely more and more on traditional European “orientalist” prejudices. In one form or another, eastern exotica fast became the rule in national film.

During the early and middle 1920s, the era of the “bourgeois entertainment film” and “commercial deviation” (kommercheskii ukлон), the All-Union Soviet Cinema Organization (Sovkino) set the pace. In the midst of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the Soviet state promoted economic and social reconstruction through flexible market forces and self-financing provisions in many industries. Profit margins drove most of the film industry; and profit margins meant foreign imports, the most popular films on the market. Urban filmgoers remained eager consumers of modern culture, just as they had been before the revolution. Of the sixty-five pictures shown at Baku’s fanciest movie houses in the fall of 1925, only four were Soviet. The rest were escapist adventures, mysteries, and melodramas like Tarzan, King of the Circus, Fear of the Yukon, and The Thief of Baghdad. Newspaper advertisements promised audiences “amazing stunts,” “masses of cowboys,” and “lightly clad dancers.” America’s “cinematic juggernaut,” in Denise Youngblood’s colorful terms, had reached Baku. Foreign films were so profitable an enterprise that the Baku Commissariat of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the ASSR, the Commission to Strengthen the Red Army and Navy, the State Oil Company, the Aviation-Chemical Council, and several leading labor and professional unions were also in the movie business. In defiance of Azerkino’s official state monopoly, they chased the profits to be made by screening the wildly popular foreign imports in the public movie houses and workers’ clubs under their jurisdictions. Sometimes they even resorted to “sideshow” attractions (live magic and circus performances) in their theaters. The Aviation-Chemical Council even claimed that it depended on film receipts to make urgent purchases of industrial goods from Moscow, pleading to the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party that without foreign film profits the oil fields would stop pumping.

Foreign imports were simply not enough to build up needed capital reserves and offer well-deserved rest and relaxation to workers.


Sovkino and its national affiliates in Tbilisi, Erevan, Bukhara, Tashkent, and Alma-Ata also made their own popular films, mixing one part serious ideology with two parts casual entertainment. Georgian cinematographers led the way. The public especially loved Ivan Perestiani’s *Arsen Dzhordzhiaishvili* (1921) for its passionate and brave revolutionary hero and his *Little Red Devils* (1923) for its action scenes of the civil war, featuring “legendary rumors” about the anarchist leader, Nestor Makhno. Both were financially successful throughout the USSR. A torrent of “pseudo-national films” soon followed, from adaptations of M. Lermontov’s high-brow *Hero of Our Time*, to low-brow pieces like *Lost Treasure, Minaret of Death*, and *The Leper Woman*. These films were usually shot on location, always with European directors, often with native acting talent. Sometimes they were loosely based on folk legends or historical events, filled with rich, realistic detail. To European cinematographers, this made them “national” enough. Native audiences were unconvinced; they walked out of *Minaret of Death* at its Bukhara premiere, embarrassed by its distorted portrayal of Muslim life. But to Sovkino and its affiliates, native audiences did not matter. They made these movies for urban Russian audiences, who still craved the old stereotypes of exotica: high cliffs, mountain streams, bustling bazaars, men on horseback, and fearsome bandits. They treated the national peripheries as little more than back lots and backwater markets, without regard for local peculiarities, and they viewed their peoples as convenient extras, already in costume.

Baku was no different. The European NEPmen engaged in filmmaking there planned to make the same kind of movies, mostly historical dramas and adventures about the anticolonial revolutions in the east. After all, they joked, the pockets of the monied classes of Baku were bulging with cash for new homemade hits; they already “devoured 42,000 watermelons and smoked 100,000 expensive cigarettes in a day.” London and Berlin, Istanbul and Teheran were also ready markets, for they still highly prized “the boulevard concoctions of Parisian eastern exoticism.” As the newly appointed director of the Baku film studio, A. A. Litvinov dreamed of making it into what he called the “Universal City” of the Soviet Union. Baku, with its tropical climate, would become the “Hollywood of the east.” For him, film was far too profitable a commodity to place in the hands of the natives. He and scores of

18. On the popular “eastern” films, see Youngblood, *Soviet Cinema in the Silent Era*, 16–20; Youngblood, *Movies for the Masses*, 59, 77–79, 87; Kenez, *Cinema and Soviet Society*, 45; *Istorija sovetskogo kino*, 1:201–10, 218–19, 618–19, 626–27, 657, 709–12; and *Bakinskii rabochii*, 31 October 1923, 22 May 1924, and 31 March 1924. Most of Makhno’s campaigns were fought on the steppes of Ukraine, but *Little Red Devils* was set amid the “wild mountains, rivers, forests and cascades” of the North Caucasus—much more romantic. From Leyda, *Kino*, 168. Several Georgian and Armenian cinematographers (Ivan Perestiani, Nikolai Shengelaia, Mikhail Chiaureli, and Amo Bek Nazarov) were among the USSR’s most successful directors.

19. RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 1 (Vostokkino production reports), ll. 85–90, 114.
“Europeans” dominated Azerbaijani: most were Russians, Jews, and Georgians; only three were Azerbaijani Turks, one of them the janitor.\textsuperscript{20}

The studio’s most successful “shock-commercial film” was its first feature production, Legend of the Maiden Tower (Legenda o devichei bashne, 1924). This film used genuine native materials: Dzhafar Dzhahbarly’s recently composed poem about the legend; Baku’s famed historical monument (the Maiden Tower); costumes and props on loan from the city’s historical museum; and leading actors from the State Turkic Theater, backed by nearly a thousand local extras. Modeled on the medieval folkloric tale about romance and betrayal at the tower, the plot reached its climax with the tragic young heroine flinging herself from the tower onto the rocks of the Caspian Sea below, rather than betray her true love and remain the khan’s captive. But the seasoned artistic and stage talent of V. V. Balliuzek turned all of this into a rather trite piece, filled with the usual harems, dazzling courts, and a series of well-crafted abduction, escape, and battle scenes. In one incident, the khan himself beheaded a treasonous eunuch, whose blood flowed from his decapitated body like a small fountain. Little matter that this was not Azerbaijan, but only what city audiences imagined Azerbaijan to be. Critics described the film as “picturesque,” fast-paced, and “electrifying.” Baku movie houses sold out for three weeks in a row during the April 1924 premiere.\textsuperscript{21}

Inspired by this success, Litvinov set out to conquer the cinematic world. Using the rich scenery of the Caucasus as a convenient backdrop for his typical Hollywood plots, he made “proletarian” comedic adventures like An Eye for an Eye, Gas for Gas (Okok za oko, Gaz za gaz, 1924), based on documentary footage of workers’ resorts, with cameo appearances by Lev Trotskii, Aleksei Rykov, Nadezhda Krupskaiia, and Demian Bednyi—all of whom just happened to be on vacation at the time of filming. On Different Shores (Na raznykh beregakh, 1925), was his attempt at a “red detective” film, based on Marietta Shaginian’s popular “Mess-Mend” novels. Set amid the factories, shipyards, and oil

\textsuperscript{20} Quoted from GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 23 (M. S. Saiapin’s remarks in the Nar-kompros ASSR reports, September and December 1920), ll. 477–83, 800. Litvinov quoted from GANI, f. 816, op. 7s, d. 6 (Azerkino and NKRKI—Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate—investigation reports, 1924), ll. 58–60, 74–77; and “Kino: Perspektivy nashei kino-promyshlennosti,” Bakinskii rabochii, 18 May 1924. GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 6 (Personnel statistics), l. 295. GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 199 (Personnel statistics), ll. 43, 55.

\textsuperscript{21} Over the next two years, the film remained a popular attraction in the city: 13,795 viewers filed into theaters to see it (as compared to the average of 5,000); it brought in 8,300 rubles in gross receipts (as compared with the average of 3,000). It also played well throughout the Soviet Union. Among the native actors who joined the production were Ismail Idaiatzade, Ibragim Azeri, and Khanafi Teregulov. The star attractions were Ernesto Vagram (Vagram Papazian) and Sof’ia Zhozefii. “Kino,” Bakinskii rabochii, 14 March 1924. V. V. Balliuzek (1881–1957) had been an artist and costume designer for the Ermoliev film factory in 1914; during his illustrious career, he worked on such films as Queen of Spades, Father Sergei, and Cigarette Girl of Mossetprom.
fields of Baku and laced with racy scenes of intrigue and romance, the plot followed the exploits of the American worker, Dick Yorker, and the young, impressionable Turk, Abbas. Together they helped to create an international workers’ movement, saved the beautiful Edith Braid from peril, and foiled the plans of Mack Neil, secret agent of the capitalists.

The Director’s Board and Main Repertory Committee of the Commissariat of Education of the ASSR were responsible for reviewing Litvinov’s film scripts to ensure a high standard of artistic quality and ideological content, as well as to weed out the ubiquitous “petty-bourgeois boulevard scripts,” sappy pieces like “The Severed Rose” and “Betrayed by the Stars.” The state company, “Oil Miners’ Cinema” (Kino gorniak), even helped to sponsor his work in the hope of providing inexpensive, enjoyable entertainment to the thousands of workers under its care.25 But in the busy days of NEP, their control was weak and inconsistent at best. Litvinov’s movies turned into unmilitated failures, suffering from weak photography and sloppy editing. Poor imitations of Hollywood classics, they turned into box office bombs. The free-wheeling NEP period in “Azerbaijani” cinema was short-lived. Litvinov’s failures gave party hardliners the perfect opportunity to mobilize cinema for purer political tasks. Centered in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate and the Main Committees on Political Education and united against Sovkino’s NEP profligacy throughout the country, they indicted Azerkino’s work between 1925 and 1926, mostly for ignoring the “highly laborious and crucial work” of ideological review and censorship. Litvinov was purged from his post, Azerkino’s staff was cut in half, and its film school was closed on account of the “academic failures” and “moral corruption” of its students. The work of the Baku film studio came to a virtual halt.24 A crackdown on

22. Another feature was The Oil Worker at Rest and Recuperation (Gorniak-neftik na otdykhe i lechenii, 1924). Marietta Shaginian wrote a series of books in the 1920s, based on the Nat Pinkerton detective series in the United States, recounting the struggles between valiant workers and vile capitalist conspirators. “Mess-Mend” was their secret password. See Marietta Shaginian, Mess Mend: Yankees in Petrograd, trans., with an introduction, Samuel D. Cioran (Ann Arbor, 1991).


24. GANI, f. 816, op. 2, d. 128 (NKRKI investigation materials, 1925–1928), ll. 1–22, 55–60. GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 199 (Azerkino production report and related materials, 1925), ll. 34–43, 65. On the broader disputes between Sovkino and the Main Committees on Political Education, see Youngblood, Movies for the Masses, 38–39; and Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 90. One of Litvinov’s bombs, Baigush (1924), a typical “eastern” adventure story, was so bad that a special commission of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party judged it totally “ridiculous and unacceptable,” forbidding its exhibition anywhere in the USSR. Azerkino quickly sent out a phony news release, sadly reporting that a “carelessly thrown cigarette” had ignited three parts of the movie’s negatives, destroying them beyond repair. It had cost nearly 17,000 rubles to make; an accidental screening in the southern city of Lenkoran brought in a grand total of 41 rubles.
foreign commercialism followed during 1927 and 1928. The profitability of films collapsed. Party ideologues now took aim against what they called “cinema-trash,” foreign and domestic films with an accent on the popular rather than the ideological. Teenage audiences, they complained, backed by the thousands of “street orphans” (bezprizornye) who made their way to temperate Baku, sometimes created scenes of “bedlam” outside the movie houses as they waited in line for such films, even spitting and swearing at the mounted police called out to keep order. Such brazen public scenes damaged the party’s disciplinary efforts on the cultural front. Soon teenagers would have little to wait in line for.25

By 1927, the agitational-propaganda department of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party (under the direction of the Armenian Bolshevik, Levon Mirzoian) took control over the film industry, finally introducing the party’s long-standing imperatives for “nativization” (korenizatsiya) and “cinefication” (kinofikatsiya) of the national borderlands, which were meant to integrate these areas more fully into the life of the Soviet state. The results were mixed. The party made contact, engaging the native peoples in innovative ways. But contact meant as much conflict and disappointment as consensus building. More and more native Azerbaijanis, some of them intellectuals in the tradition of the nineteenth-century Muslim enlightenment (among them, Abbas Mirza Sharifzade and Dzhabar Dzhabarly), filled positions within the industry. They were promoted as the profits waned. Yet they were still under the burdensome direction and censorship of European outsiders, about whom they became ever more critical and resentful in coming years.26

Cinema also made its first forays into the distant provinces of Azerbaijan, a process that made impressive achievements over the next decade, at least in the number of movie houses.27 Popular enthusiasm ran high in the beginning. On the new revolutionary holidays of the Soviet regime, the women and children of Nukha flocked to the cinema house where they were presented with free film previews. Workers and peasants were so excited by their first movie that they followed “every little movement on the screen” and did not want it to end. Azerkino made serious attempts to reach them with titles in Azerbaijan’s new Latin alphabet, recently commissioned by the Bolshevik party in Moscow to do battle with the traditional Arabic script of Islam. Almost 100 films, most of them features, were edited in the new al-


26. GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 6 (Personnel statistics), l. 295; GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 199 (Personnel statistics), ll. 43, 55. Before it was closed, the Baku film studio trained Dzhabar Dzhabarly, Mikail Mikailov, and Agarza Kuliev as its first native directors.

27. For details on the number of movie houses in both Baku and the provinces, see appendix A.
phabet and became popular vehicles for basic literacy. The Central Committee may have suppressed market commercialism, but its new cinema imperatives did little to raise the national peripheries out of their second-rate status as backwater markets. National cinema studios throughout the USSR were troubled, thanks largely to Sovkino, which obstructed their efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia, mostly because of its desire to maintain a monopoly on cinema profits. Outside Baku, “apathy” about cinema began to spread from the largest cities (Gandzhak, Nukha, and Lenkoran) to the smallest villages. When their rising expectations and tastes could not be satisfied, people lost their love of film as quickly as they had found it. Azerkino used only its shoddiest equipment to service the provinces on account of the rough roads and strain of transportation. Coupled with the long distances between movie houses and the unreliability of electricity, this meant that people waited months between films or suffered through long runs of the same one. Many believed that cinema was meant only for those few who knew Russian well enough to read the titles. After all, most national-language titles were made only for “ideologically sound” Soviet movies that had been preapproved by the party for screening in workers’ and peasants’ regions. In a word, movies that were no fun—tattered copies of low-budget dramas like The Elder Vasiliy Griaznov or preachy pieces like The Struggle with Malaria.

Disgusted with the excesses of European “orientalism,” which were characterized by a “hatred of the peoples of the east,” the ideologues with the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party also turned their attention to making a new kind of realistic feature film. As part of its initiatives in NEP gradualism and social peace, what Sheila Fitzpatrick has called a “soft line” in cultural policy, Moscow urged party members to proceed with extreme caution in dealing with local religious and ethnic sensibilities. In their militant campaigns against Islam, party members were to avoid the use of blunt force and were instead to rely on the more subtle instruments of persuasion. Film was just such an instrument, their most “powerful agitator” with the non-Russian public. “Images are stronger than words,” they proclaimed, especially in the Muslim east, where the peasants were still in the throes of “ignorance and darkness,” still suffering under the “yoke

28. Reports on film in the provinces (1926 and 1928), in GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 449, l. 1; and d. 479, l. 179.
29. Taylor, Politics of the Soviet Cinema, 92. Sovkino tried over and over again to restrict Vostokkino’s control over Russian populations within non-Russian regions, or to prevent its movies from being screened in the USSR. Vostokkino discussions (1928–1931) in RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 1, l. 108; d. 10, ll. 94–95; d. 38, l. 4.
30. Azerkino production reports (1926–1929) in GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 1, l. 6; and d. 8, ll. 327, 347; f. 1305, op. 1, d. 49, l. 32; f. 57, op. 1, d. 577, l. 16. Sometimes Azerkino smuggled commercial films into the villages against the prohibitions of the censors, simply to make a profit. Happy was that day for the eager village audience. Main Committees on Political Education reports (1926), in GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 449, l. 6; and GAPPOD f. 1, op. 235, d. 199, l. 53.
of superstition and the opiate of religion.”31 This principle had already been tested through the critical realism of the master story writer and dramatist of the nineteenth century, M. F. Akhundov; in the light-hearted satires of the playwright, Uzeir Gadzhibekov, several of which were made into films during 1917 and 1918; and in the plays that the Turkic Satirical-Agitational Theater staged all over the country between 1921 and 1929. Centering on the everyday lives of local audiences and poking fun at the stubborn vestiges of male chauvinism within the Muslim religious establishment, their stories dramatized the classics of Turkic folklore and literature. By building on these initiatives and by effectively co-opting native trends, the Central Committee hoped that film might similarly open its antireligious campaigns with simple stories, characters, and images that would hold traditional Islam up to ridicule.32 But if the themes of modernization were the same, the goals were radically different. Native modernizers had set out to reform Islam, to secularize its values in civic consciousness. Moscow had in mind its eradication from national life.

The realist style in national film was born in this atmosphere of managed cultural revolution. Azerkino cinematographers pioneered this realism with In the Name of God (Vo imia Boga, 1925), directed by the Baku stage director and longtime Bolshevik sympathizer, Abbas Mirza Sharifzade and written by one of Russia’s leading communist propagandists, P. A. Bliakhin.33 Touted as the “first great antireligious film” of the Soviet era, its plot revolved around a reprobate cleric who was eventually condemned by Soviet justice, but not before he ruined the lives of the women he had seduced and caused the death of an innocent young boy. Its very title, mimicking the opening lines of the Koran, set the sacrilegious tone. Azerkino’s strategy was to release it as the opening volley in the party’s battle with the Shiite Muslim holy season of Maggerem (the first month of the lunar year) and its associated ritual, “shakhsei-vakhsei,” in which devout Muslims beat themselves with bared swords or whips and proclaim the cryptic chant,


32. The director B. Svetlov filmed two of Gadzhibekov’s works, A Measure of Cloth (Arshin mal alan) and If Not This, Then That (Ne ta, tak eta), in 1918. Azerkino filmed them again in 1945 and 1957, respectively. GANI f. 57, op. 1, d. 752 (Report on the theater’s activities), l. 4. On the Azerbaijani enlightenment in general, and its mutations under the Soviet regime, see Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition (New York, 1995), 25–36.

33. Bliakhin was the author of the recent hit, Little Red Devils. Sharifzade, who directed with the guidance of Balluzek and Litvinov, was a veteran dramatist who had helped to stage anticlerical satires and pro-Bolshevik agitational plays in earlier years. Riza Akhundov, “Kak proshla antimageramskaia kampaniia,” Bakinskii rabochii, 10 August 1925. “Kino: S’emka shakhsei-vakhsei,” Bakinskii rabochii, 2 October 1924.
“shakhsei-vakhsei” (Shah Hussein, O Hussein), to commemorate his martyrdom. The film, which included a very realistic scene of self-flagellation, was shown in the neighborhoods of Baku and in the provinces with the aim of exposing Islam’s “ignorance, darkness, and fanaticism.” To communist ideologists, this was not hyperbole but fact. In the fall of 1924, a cinema troupe (the director G. Kravchenko, cameraman V. Lemke, and a veteran actor from the Baku stage, Mamedov) traveled to the village of Shikhov to shoot “shaksei-vakhsei” for an agitational film. But as Mamedov was acting out the ritual, a crowd of devout villagers, irate at the travesty of their religious customs, began to throw rocks at the camera. Kravchenko and Lemke fled for their lives, their camera equipment in tow. Mamedov would have been stoned to death were it not for the intervention of other Azerbaijani actors. In a scene fit for the best American western, a detachment of twenty-five mounted soldiers then liberated him from the crowd and whisked him off to the local hospital for treatment. None of this was actually caught on camera, unfortunately, as Kravchenko and Lemke were still in flight.

In the Name of God was a monumental achievement for the young Soviet propaganda state. As a film in the national realist style, it opened a new chapter in cinema history, which would now reflect the “everyday life,” “darkness,” and “diffuse backwardness” of the peoples of the east. These themes dominated the work of Azerkino, Vostokkino, and Central Asian cinema for the decades to come. Sometimes their movies were known as examples of “ethnographic” realism because they set out to photograph the distant lands and cultures of the USSR as neutral, objective, national facts. The party had made this style respectable with its new political formula for the USSR—“national in form, socialist in content.” Cinematographers turned it into great art, splicing national forms (raw native talent, historical chronicles, exotic rituals, and brilliant scene photography) into the master plot of socialist realism, a cinematic montage for the east. Bek Nazarov’s Khaspush (1928), Nikolai Shengelaia’s Eliso (1928), and Vsevolod Pudovkin’s renowned Storm over Asia (1929) perfected the style. Memorable protagonists were at the center of their stories, characters once locked in time, now liberated by revolutionary forces far beyond their comprehension or control. In a moment of rare honesty, Bek Nazarov recognized the hazards of their endeavor, calling it “dark” (mrachnyi) rather than “ethnographic” realism because these films took such a patronizing approach to the east, illuminating the injustice of Muslim customary law, clerical corruption, religious fanaticism, and the chronic dirt, disease, and ignorance. Realism was less concerned with distinct national cultures than with generalized eastern backwardness. It turned

34. Makhmudbekov, “Ob azerbaidzhanaskoi kinematografii,” Trud (Baku), 17 December 1927. Vostokkino founding protocols and production plans (1928–1929 and 1930–1931) in RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 1, l. 34; d. 3, ll. 2, 9; d. 19, l. 82; and d. 11, l. 86.
national form into ignoble savagery. Or as one national representative noted, the style smacked of the old-fashioned distinction between the “cultured west and uncultured east.”

The Soviet government had established Azerkino and its “eastern” affiliates—each with its own domestic infrastructure, each dedicated to such serious and high-minded themes—in order to overcome the remnants of ethnic prejudice from late imperial culture. Instead, these industries ended up institutionalizing a Marxist chauvinism, giving ethnic prejudice a more legitimate space on the screen. Rather than fulfilling the promise of national self-determination, nativization in cinema merely locked native cadres into new orientalist images of themselves. In one of the most notorious cases, Azerkino enlisted the leading members of the Baku theater to make Gadzhi Kara (1928). Sharifzade once again directed. A cast of Azerbaijan’s finest stage actors joined the production. The popular Azerbaijani writer, Dzhafar Dzhabarly, wrote the script for the movie, based on a favorite story from the works of M. F. Akhundov, who had originally crafted it as a comedy about the follies of merchants and landowners in the early years of Russian conquest. But the party censors were not amused. They turned the story into a heavy-handed drama about the class struggle against religion and traditional village life. Thus prepared by the highest standard of native participation and political correctness, the film was distributed to movie houses. Audiences responded by ignoring it.

By the fall of 1928, in unison with Moscow’s initial drive to collectivize village farms and persecute what was left of established religion, the anti-Islam campaign moved from images to action throughout the USSR. In the Muslim Caucasus and Central Asia, the party closed down the religious schools and began to persecute clerics for their influence in the countryside. The campaign also began a frontal attack on a tradition still precious to many fathers and husbands, the veil. By focusing its energies on the “surrogate proletariat,” Muslim women, Moscow sought to bring class struggle to the gender front. Ritual “unveilings” became a dramatic public display of the reaches of Soviet power on the peripheries. Yet from such severe actions the campaign moved

35. For background, see Istoriia sovetskogo kino, 1:300–304, 658–67; Mamata, Mno- gonatsional’noe sovetsko kino-iskusstvo, 46–47; and Leyda, Kino, 248–50. The quote is from a Sakut representative, quoted in RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 1 (Vostokkino production reports), l. 94.

36. On Gadzhi Kara, see GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 8 (Protocol of the Repertory Committee of Narkompros), l. 23; and the commentary in “Sona (Gadzhi Kara),” in the Latin-script publication, Gandzh ischii (Young worker), 15 March 1929. I have not been able to find any existing copies of this film. Among the theater stars participating were M. A. Aliev, Aziza Mamedova, G. A. Abasov, Sona Gadzhieva, and S. Rukhulla.

back to milder images. Popular resistance to the anti-Islam campaign was strong. Some men beat or murdered their wives and daughters for rejecting the veil. Most village women were unable to even imagine the audacity. So the party again turned to film for its power to agitate and move the masses. To ideologues intent on shaking the foundations of Islamic culture and exploiting the boulevard tastes of most audiences, Muslim women offered considerable propaganda and entertainment potential. They could be portrayed as revolutionaries with sex appeal, still vulnerable to the old patriarchy, still the objects of male desire, but thereby all the more provocative when unveiled as full-fledged participants in Soviet power. Women’s liberation, drawing from a long tradition of their exotic portrayal in Russian fiction about the Caucasus, now became a favorite theme in Soviet film. Dziga Vertov applied it successfully in his Three Songs of Lenin (1934) as a colorful metaphor for the greater colonial revolution in the east, as if the east itself were a woman, anxious to be unmasked, set free. Dozens of Muslim women unveiled themselves on movie screens over the next few decades, sometimes quite dramatically, as in the case of the Azerkino production of Ismet (1934), in which the wind ripped the main character’s veil from her face as she flew in an open-air cockpit (see figure 1).

Azerbaijan’s first contribution to this genre was a classic, Sevil’ (1929). Directed by Dzhabarly and Bek Nazarov (both under the guidance of Vsevolod Pudovkin, who was passing through Baku at the time), it was the story of an impressionable young wife struggling to break free from the strictures of Muslim life (the veil, customary law, and her husband). Sevil’ offers an interesting case study into the shifting boundaries between cinematic fact and fiction. The directors claimed to have scoured the streets and schools of Baku for weeks looking for the right woman to play the lead role. In the tradition of Sergei Eisenstein, Dzhabarly wanted an amateur, an ordinary woman who might help to overthrow the established patriarchy and give true inspiration to the thousands of women who were about to enter the schools and workplaces of Soviet Azerbaijan. He and Bek Nazarov finally found their woman—Izzet Orudzheva—during a walk along the Caspian Sea embankment. As they followed her home, eyeing her all the way, look-

221–39; Dzheikhun Gadzhibeili, Izhbranno e (Baku, 1993); and the interior police and agitational-propaganda documents in GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 74, d. 280 (Documents of the State Political Directorate and of the Agitation-Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, September 1928), ll. 4–26.


39. Also see the discussions of such movies as Vtoraya zhena (Uzbekkino, 1927), Chadra (Uzbekkino, 1927), and Doch’ sviatogo (Uzbekkino, 1931), in Istoriia sovetskogo kinema, 1:702–9; and in Sovetskie khudochestvennye fil’my. Annotirovanny katalog, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1961–1968). For historical background on Russian cultural paradigms of Caucasian women, see Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy (New York, 1994).
ing more and more indecent to the poor, unsuspecting girl, they became convinced that she was the right choice. Orudzheva had no acting experience whatsoever, but was the first female student at the Baku Petrochemical Institute, a living example of the spirit of Sevil' in real life. Sevil' and its sequel, Almas (1934), proved that fairy tales can come true. As Orudzheva reminisced, at first she was shy and still trapped in her traditional roles, but slowly she emerged as an outgoing and confident person and actress. Her struggles in real life fused with Sevil’s struggles on the screen. Orudzheva went on to become one of the first female petroleum engineers in the whole USSR; likewise, Sevil' joined the Women’s Department of the Central Committee (Zhenotdel), and in her later incarnation as the young communist, Almas, fought for Soviet values in the Azerbaijani countryside. “They were me,” Orudzheva later reminisced, “although acted out in different life settings.” For Azerbaijani women, in turn, Sevil' and Almas became “symbols of emancipation.”40

To the dismay, but reluctant acceptance, of party ideological censors, Sevil' contained unabashed scenes of bourgeois life, naughty ro-

mance, and raw adventure. Like several other successful pictures of the early Soviet era—including Iakov Protozanov's *Aelita, Queen of Mars* and Avram Room's *Third Meshchanskaia Street*—it gleefully portrayed the decadence of the 1920s. Among its villains was a rather sympathetic "philistine bank director" and his colorful, "Frenchified bourgeois coquette." Viewers were treated to elaborate scenes of Baku night life. But these wrappings made the propaganda message of the film, centered around Sevil"s liberation, all the more appealing. It enjoyed financial success at home and abroad (mainly in Turkey and China). It was also a propaganda victory. Bek Nazarov reported that at one showing in Baku he personally watched as women leaving the movie house "threw off their veils and walked out of the theater with open faces." The party's entertainment gamble, a function of the "soft line" in culture, had paid off. Its administrators had taken control over national film, but not on their own exclusive terms, and not without exploiting the popular taste for amusement and distraction. The ideological idiom of Soviet power had adapted itself to the narrative language of cinema.

Less powerful in popular effect, but more visually stunning, was *Daughter of Gilian* (Doch' Giliana, 1928), set in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan (northern Iran) during 1920 and 1921 and filmed partly in the southern border town of Lenkoran. Azerkino finally made a movie to fulfill the charge of the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East: to inspire the oppressed colonial peripheries to rise up in revolt. The story pitted the Gilan rebel leader and Bolshevik ally, Mirza Kuchik Khan, against the forces of British imperialism and reactionary Iranian feudalism. Originally titled "The Bronze Moon" in Iurii Slezkin's early scripts, it was more melodrama than propaganda. Critics noted that the film had little to do with revolutionary history or politics. In one evocative dance scene, the character Maro—clad only in bells, peacock feathers, and a snake—enticed her suitor to drink a glass of cognac perched on her own lips. Moved by what he had just witnessed, the villain then offered to buy her from the tavern owner for her weight in gold. Only at the very end of the film did the leading female character rather awkwardly take up arms for the Bolshevik revolution. Much of the propaganda message was lost by then, but audiences did not mind. The movie was also a remarkable accomplishment of film narrative and technique. The Russian director, Lev Murashko, and the cameraman, I. S. Frolov, applied Eizenshtein's montage techniques with great effect in scenes that mingled images of Caucasian dancers, English soldiers on bicycles, and mounted communist guer-

rillas; or that spliced together the grotesque faces and the behinds of British officers and their horses.42

Fact and fiction, entertainment and propaganda fused creatively in the production of one of Azerkino’s finest films, The Twenty-Six Commissars (Dvadtsat’shešt’ komissar0v, 1933), directed by the Georgian N. Shengelaia. This film, dedicated to the leading Bolsheviks “martyred” by White forces during the civil war, had been discussed at the highest levels of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party for years.43 Bliakhin (coming off his successes with Little Red Devils and In the Name of God) wrote the script by navigating between the artistic extremes of Eizenshtein and Room, both of whom had been invited to Baku to make the film but declined. In the style of Eizenshtein’s Battleship Potemkin, Bliakhin dramatized the “main forces of the epoch,” the proletarian and peasant masses, expressly forbidding the twenty-six from assuming “poses along the lines of a Napoleon or heroes in Shakespeare.” Their revolutionary values of “simplicity and naturalism” counted most, not bourgeois cinematic “sentimentality.” “We need to reveal their strength of will,” he wrote, “their certainty of victory, their endurance.” But in the style of Room’s Third Meshchanskaya Street, Bliakhin also paid attention to a handful of fictional characters: Meshkov, a “Russian bear,” a good-hearted happy knight; and Dzhangir, a “typical Turk with clearly expressed national features—handsome, resourceful, hot-tempered and strong.” They were necessary, he thought, to please the simple tastes of the movie-going public.44

Baku’s top party echelons took special care to provide the script with the proper mix of historical realism and adventuresome drama. They wanted to photograph the look and feel of Baku. Veterans from the civil war days, who had actually lived through the events, debated even the smallest details of the film, down to the right kind of sunflower seeds that certain characters munched on for snacks. Yet others in the discussions proposed bending history in order to tap into the “revolutionary pathos” of the civil war era. In one completely fabricated scene, the Bolshevik commissar S. G. Shaumian flew in a seaplane to view the grand city of Baku. As one party leader asked at the discussions, “Will the history of the revolution really suffer if Shaumian


43. For the events surrounding the executions of the “twenty-six,” see Ronald G. Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1972). The hagiography went into full swing when the Azerbaijani Communist Party celebrated their memory in print and commissioned the film. See GANI, f. 379, op. 3, d. 45 (Decree of the Baku Committee, 26 July 1923), l. 60; and the special edition of Bakinskii rabochii, 20 September 1923.

44. GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 6 (Azerkino production materials, 1926), ll. 43–48. RGALI, f. 2214, op. 2, d. 10 (Room’s report). Quoted from RGALI, f. 2214, op. 2, d. 11 (P. A. Bliakhin’s screenplay, 1926).
flies?” After all, with the right camera angle, the scene perfectly lifted the dramatic pace. Cinema made it all so easy. Little matter that history was falsified. The enormity of the events and the sacrifice of the twenty-six demanded a degree of artistic license, socialist style.\footnote{45}

By the time \textit{The Twenty-Six Commissars} was released in 1933, the principle of socialist license was already becoming the rule in Soviet cinema. The propaganda state harnessed art and culture to serve the practical needs of the Five-Year Plans: industrialization and collectivization. Ideas and images on the printed page and on screen now justified the tremendous economic and social dislocations of these years. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party delivered an ultimatum that Azerkino produce and distribute films totally devoted to the goal of “socialist construction” and therefore to “completely desist from releasing apolitical, ideologically unsound films.” To enforce this decree, the Central Committee’s “Artistic-Political Council,” backed by censors at Sovkino in Moscow, policed the whole process of filmmaking—from the original idea, through the writing and revision of scripts, to the actual production and screening. Stalin played the role of “chief censor” by giving his final approval.\footnote{46} Cinematographers now refined the realist style in national film; their imperative, to “cultivate the mass viewer in the spirit of socialism.” They still highlighted “local color” to represent the benefits of secularism, women’s emancipation, and Bolshevik rule but now applied the heroic Russian model of sovietization and collectivization with more vigor. If native characters had once loomed large against the backdrop of indigenous backwardness, now they shrank before the might of the Russian model, what Robert Tucker has called a kind of “national Bolshevism.” The best and brightest native communists adopted the look, lifestyles, and values of Russians. Their task was to “illustrate the victory of the new over the old, but to illustrate it on our national ground.”\footnote{47}

In effect, socialist realism meant a hardening of ethnic stereotypes,
a sharpening of Soviet orientalist categories. Its ideological prescriptions threw the old world into harsher relief, making it seem more backward, more villainous than ever. National films now recounted the struggle with the brutal nature of Central Asia and Siberia. The struggle may have been fierce, but the rewards were also great, especially for the Russian frontiersmen who, with the help of European science and technology, forced nature to yield its riches: reindeer, cotton, oil, or even rare gems. National films also began to portray the east as a scene of dangers, as a wild frontier of bandits to be conquered over and over again by brave Soviet “frontier guards” (pogranichniki), especially in the deserts and mountains of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, where Basmachi and other rebels still roamed. In Azerbaijan’s first “socialist realist” films, the representatives of traditional Islamic culture reached new lows as scoundrels: husbands more abusive, mullahs greedier, mobs more fanatic than ever. They made the Soviet future—represented by clean factories, efficient collective farms, and the streamlined Latin script—look all the brighter. None of these movies made for great cinema. Sovkino judged them mediocre at best. But it also valued these works as native products meant largely for native audiences. They were decent second-rate films from distant second-rate republics.

To its credit, the Soviet film industry did seek to promote mutual respect and harmony between the country’s ethnic groups, albeit at the cost of their own cultural self-determination. Azerkino struck all negative portrayals of Armenians and Russians in one of its scripts, even as the most innocent ethnic humor. In a story about the Kazakh uprising against the tsarist regime in 1916, Vostokkino took special care to create sympathetic Russian characters so as not to incite any “russophobia among the local population.” It also scrapped a 1929 script, described as an “everyday drama” about cannibalism among the Votiak peoples, for being too inflammatory. Several nationality films taught a more explicit lesson about Soviet internationalism, most often through stories about interethnic romances between Christian girls and Muslim boys, or Russian pig farmers and Dagestani shepherds—the Romeos and Juliets of the Soviet present.

48. See such pieces as Zabyt’nel’z’ia (1931); Sem’serdets (Turkmenskoe kino, 1934); Khishchina starogo luzena (Mosfil’m, 1935); Liudi doliny sumbar (Turkmenskoe kino, 1938); Novyi gorizont (Bakinskiaa kinostudiia, 1940); Sad (Stalinabadskiaa kinostudiia, 1939); and Almazy (Sverdlovskiaa kinostudiia, 1947)—in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my.

49. See such pieces as Aigul’ (Sovuzdetfil’m, 1936); Umar (Turkmenfil’m, 1936); Trinadtsat’ (Mosfil’m, 1936); Druz’ia vstreachaists’ vno’ (Tadjikhiskoe kino, 1939); Pogranichniki (Ashkhabadskiaa kinostudiia, 1940); Zastava v gorakh (Mosfil’m, 1953)—in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my.

50. I have in mind such Azerkino movies as Letif (1934), Ismet (1934), and Almas (1934). Sovkino reviews in RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 112; and d. 113, ll. 1–6, 26–27.

51. GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 8 (Protocol of the Repertory Committee of Narkompros), l. 23. RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 1 (Script discussions at Vostokkino, 1928), l. 22. See the descriptions of Giulli (1927); Eliso (1928); Dom na vulkane (1928); Asal’ (Tashkentskaa kinostudiia, 1940); Soyinka i pastukh (Mosfil’m, 1941); and Nerushimaia druzhba (Erevanskiaa kinostudiia, 1939)—in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my.
stereotypes still crept into film scenarios. During debates at the Baku film studio in 1934, Azerbaijani cinematographers acknowledged the need for characters who were “national in form,” who displayed a distinct “national color.” Audiences should feel the right “psychology” of their fellow natives on film, should “recognize even the dog lying on the rooftop” of the peasant’s hut. Yet the cinematographers also saw a danger in such typecasting, for the characters might then become “grotesque” and laughable to Russian audiences, or embarrassing to Azerbaijanis. They warned that the folk props of wine and barbecued meat (kebab) in the average script were shallow representations of national culture, that they “smelled of the old attitude toward the east.”

Boris Barnet’s At the Deepest Blue Sea (U samogo sinego moria, 1935), a comedy about the antics of a Caspian fishing collective, proved this point all too well. Both Russian and Azerbaijani reviewers criticized Iusuf, the movie’s main Azerbaijani character, as being too simple and cheerful, “too detailed a national character,” especially when he sang and played the mandolin. Here was proof that what they called the “banalities” of “eastern exoticism” were not yet dead in Soviet film. But Barnet, a veteran director from the experimental Russian studios of the early 1920s, was simply toeing the general line, outfitting the movie with the stock figures of every class and nationality who filled the entertaining “mass” comedies of the day.

The dominant genre within cinematic socialist realism was the “historical-revolutionary” film, usually covering the events before and during the Bolshevik revolution. In it we see political interference and ethnic stereotyping in clearest relief. Almost all of the major Soviet nationalities made such films, but with one crucial difference: in Georgian and Armenian productions, the active revolutionaries and Bolsheviks were almost always natives who made their own kind of revolution for their own peoples. The “backward” nationalities of the east were not so privileged. A whole series of Russian teachers—“the worker Andrei Kravtsov,” the “soldier-Bolshevik Egor,” the rebel leader Pugachev, the “Bolshevik Vasilii,” or the “great” V. I. Lenin—taught the natives the proper lessons about class consciousness and revolutionary activity. Some of these peoples were so “small”—like the poor Chukchi—that they were not even involved in revolutionary events. They faced no greater enemy than their own poor hygiene and sha-

52. GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 14 (Protocols of the Literary Department of the Baku film factory, February and March 1934), ll. 7–14, 17–18, 20–23.
54. See the descriptions of Poslednii maskarad (1934); Pepo (Armenkino, 1935); Arsen (Goskiprom Gruzii, 1937); Karo (Armenkino, 1937); Zangezur (Armenkino, 1938); Sevanskie rybaki (Erevanskaia kinostudiia, 1939); Kadzhana (Tbilisskaia kinostudiia, 1941); and Georgii Saakashvili (Tbilisskaia kinostudiia, 1943)—in Sovetskie khudoschestvennye fil’my.
manist practices, which the kind “social worker Kuznetsov” and the sympathetic teacher Tat’iana Petrovna worked patiently to overcome.55

Like these productions, Azerkino’s historical-revolutionary films scripted a fictional Bolshevik past and constructed a new historical memory for the Azerbaijani people. Facts were still important; socialist realism meant that writers and directors should root their stories in reality. But the heightened emphasis on fiction, on the master plot, meant that they should also flatten the facts, manipulate history to the party’s liking. Characters in They Came from Baku (Bakintsy, 1938) and Peasants (Kendliliar, 1939), set during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, were sketched according to the new lore of Soviet orientalism, by special order from the Central Committees of the Russian Communist Party and the Azerbaijani Communist Party. The Slavs in the former were the professionals and activists like the healer and teacher, Dr. Mikhailov; or the “bearded Russian master worker,” the steadfast Zakharych, who politely removed his shoes and spoke some Azerbaijani when visiting the home of a Turk. The Azerbaijani, in contrast, were the artless pledges of Russian hegemony, like the “dark faced” and “slow speaking” oil driller Dzhafar, just one man among the masses of “poorly dressed Turkic workers,” who were less acting extras than simple props set against the oil rigs of Baku. The images of Azerbaijani in Peasants were even more “memorable and graphic” (one of Moscow’s script conditions), especially in contrast with the alert and class-conscious Slavic character, Petro. Goidamir, the “singing revolutionary,” was the voice of “popular grief” and the “spontaneous rebel” (figure 2). Ul’fet, his romantic interest and revolutionary partner, was the daughter of a common, poor Azerbaijani peasant, the “personification of fear.” Mekhmandarbek, the feudal lord and master, was “sly, two-faced, and despotic” (figure 3).56

Behind the scenes, native critic in Azerkino and the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party were troubled by these chauvinist distinctions. As more and more of them filled positions within the government and party apparatuses, they became politicized to their own ethnicity and to the ways in which it was projected onto the big screen—a remarkable development given the severity of the purges against the national intelligentsia between 1928 and 1938.57

55. See the descriptions of Krytyi furgon (1927); Kliaatva (Uzbekfil’m, 1937); Druz’ia (Lenfil’m, 1938); Amangel’dy (Lenfil’m, 1938); Salavat Iulayev (Soiuuzdetfil’m, 1940); Romantiki (Soiuuzdetfil’m, 1941); Ego zovut Sukhe-Bator (Mongolkino, 1942); Dzhambul (Alma-Atinskaia kinostudiia, 1952); Bai i battrak (Tashkentskaia kinostudiia, 1954)—in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my.

56. The character descriptions for Bakintsy (directed by V. Turin) are from RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 144 (V. Turin’s script); and for Kendliliar (directed by Samed Mardanov) from GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 26 (Main Cinematography Directorate of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars SSSR, April 1937), ll. 1–2. Kendliliar should not be confused with Fridrikh Ermler’s Peasants (1935).

57. For background on the purges, see Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, chap. 8; and Simon, Nationalism and Policy, 81–87.
Figure 2. The peasant rebel, Goidamir (left, played by A. Alekperov), and his trusted revolutionary teacher, the Slavic Petro (right, played by B. Baikov) (*Peasants*, 1939).

Figure 3. The feudal lord, Mekhmandarbek (center, played by Kh. Emirzade), flanked by his loyal lieutenants (*Peasants*, 1939).
Movie characters, they protested, spoke in “proverbs,” in a demeaning folkloric speech, not in the “everyday, genuine language of Azerbaijanis.” Dzhafar’s character was “schematic, primitive, and naive”; his dialogue was childlike and impish. He sang and danced in happier moments and even played the fool in order to trick the jailer and save his Russian comrades from punishment. Poor Dzhafar was little more than the court jester of the Baku revolutionary underground. But these protests went largely unanswered. The propaganda state’s elaborate system of surveillance and control silenced them. At a high party conference called to deal with the criticisms, M. D. Bagirov (head of the Azerbaijani Communist Party) stood firm. He agreed to “enliven” Dzhafar’s character and to add a few more Turkic workers to the scenes. But he brooked no “fantastic” or “exaggerated” representations of Azerbaijani reality. Revolution was always made by Russians, after all; the “first seeds of Bolshevism were planted here by Russian revolutionaries, sent by Lenin himself.”

Cinematographers were much more cautious about representing the historical role of Stalin in the Transcaucasus underground. To promote the mystique of the “great leader” and protect themselves from any deviations, Bagirov and his censors never expressly portrayed Stalin as a character in *They Came from Baku*. Workers lovingly referred to him as Koba (his underground alias). Bolshevik revolutionaries from Tbilisi and Erevan smuggled his political directives into Baku by train. Dzhafar learned to read in prison by memorizing one of his books. The tsarist police scanned their files for his photograph. But like the prophet Mohammed, the face of Stalin never appeared in the picture. Nor did Stalin’s face appear in the 1939 production of *Aina*, which centered around the “passionate love and unbounded loyalty of the Azerbaijani people for their father and teacher, leader and friend.” To show her devotion, the central character (Aina) tried to stitch Stalin’s portrait into the fabric of an oriental carpet. All too human an artist in the face of such greatness, she could never quite “get the smile right.” The Azerbaijani producers had an equally rough time in making this film, which they finally aborted after considerable expense and scandal.

These troubles were signs of a deeper pathology in the national film industry. The 1930s saw the advancement of natives in institutional terms. In Azerbaijan, they now comprised a majority of directors,
assistant directors, artists, and scriptwriters. About a dozen studied the art and business of film at the State Institute of Cinematography in Moscow. But these were quantitative rather than qualitative achievements. Native filmmakers at both Azerkino and Vostokkino suffered from an inferiority complex. All of their major productions were made with outside assistance of one kind or another, often with temporary experts (Balliuzez, Litvinov, Pudovkin, Murashko, Bek Nazarov, V. Turin, Shengelaia, and Barnet, as we have already seen) who were brought in to take charge of a film production but then left as soon as it was over. This reliance on outside help turned into a vicious cycle of self-doubt, with natives never fully learning or taking charge of production. Visitors from Moscow did not help matters with their public displays of chauvinism. Azerbajani promoters at Azerkino complained that the European directors of the Literary-Artistic Department were ensconced in a “fortress” of racist attitudes against native talent and discriminated against their scripts. Others protested that a visiting cinematographer from Russia put on airs as their “god and tsar.” On a shoot in Kazakhstan, the Vostokkino director Bykhovskii was even accused of “dictatorial” and “great-power chauvinism” for treating his Tatar assistant like a lackey and for calling the Kazakh actors our “former dogs” and “dirty bastards.”

The dilemma went even deeper. Native screenwriters were often not fluent or eloquent enough in Russian, in the language of cinema, or in the idiom of communism to write viable scripts. European directors and party censors were rarely pleased. Visiting directors often rewrote native scripts with urban Russian audiences and their own ethnic prejudices in mind. They manipulated national color to better serve their plots, creating a set of sliding stereotypes with just a few national distinctions between them, as applicable to Iakutiia as to Azerbajian. In Vostokkino they distorted national images, creating Ingush who were “wild people,” Komi who were “sluggish and colorless,” and Tatars who were “murderers, thugs, and prostitutes.” European directors moved among so many different locations, and were so ignorant of local cultures, that their native characters began to look and feel the same. In the words of one critic, they created an “eternal primitive” for all places and times. Others protested that Vostokkino’s movies mimicked the colonial novels of the British empire, filled with the crass

60. GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 1090 (Azerkino production reports, 1934), l. 4; and GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 1141 (Azerkino production reports, 1940), l. 28. Among those recruited by the State Institute of Cinematography were Samed Mardanov, Ali Sattar Atakishiev, Rza Takhmisib, Mekhti Gusein, Rasul Rza, Enver Mamedkhanly, Sabit Rakhman, Gusein Seidzade, Tafik Tagizade, and Niiazi Badalov. Native Azerbajani writers—Samed Vurgun, Firza Ibrasimov, Mekhti Gusein, Suleiman Rustam—also began to play more active roles in the writing of scripts and the production of films.  
61. GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 1090 (Azerkino report, 1934), l. 12. GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 795 (Letter of protest from Niiazi Badalov to the Central Committee of the Azerbajani Communist Party, October 1936), l. 17. GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 75 (Discussion, 1937), ll. 99–100. Letters of protest (1933) in RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 25, l. 91; and d. 52, ll. 68–69.
imagery of European superiority and Asian backwardness, all the tired characters of lords, maharajahs, spies, lovers, murderers, and more spies. Only now the character of a “Lord Ramsey” was exchanged for a Soviet “Michurinite.” A strange circular logic seemed to operate in national cinema. The undeveloped peoples of the east needed film in order to help propel them into the future; yet film recapitulated the very images of backwardness that it was designed to overcome.

Stock characters were so common in Vostokkino’s productions, in part, because its directors needed movies that could sell universally across the expanse of the USSR, from one national region to the next. Silent movies made this possible. But with the advent of sound in the 1930s, Vostokkino’s work became very nearly impossible. It was simply too expensive to make sound movies in the different non-Russian languages of the RSFSR. The individual markets were just too small. So the film industry began to rely more and more on dubbing Russian-language productions into the non-Russian languages. Azerkino found its own special niche in the industry when it produced the first such dubbing in the history of Soviet cinema. Chapayev, the consummate socialist realist film, and a classic piece of orientalism in its own right, holds the honor. Shua Sheikov spent six months, day and night, “teaching Chapayev to speak in Azerbaijani.” The dubbed version traveled throughout the Turkic-speaking republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as abroad in Turkey and northern Persia. The Azerbaijannis now argued that Baku should become the center of a new dubbing industry for the east, with Azerbaijani as the Turkic lingua franca of cinema. Moscow was not convinced, favoring separate dubbings into the major Turkic languages. Its paramount concern was to maintain the purity of any Russian-language usage in all national films. A conference dedicated to the issue in 1938 announced that henceforth any use of Russian be spoken not by the national actors themselves, but be dubbed later into the purer, accent-free dialect of Russian speakers. The advent of sound in film and radio had elevated the stock of

62. Quoted from Vostokkino script reviews (1929–1931) in RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 10, l. 106; and d. 3, l. 6; and d. 38, ll. 3–5, 10–39. Script reviews (1930 and 1935) in RGALI, f. 2489, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 29, 49; and d. 108, l. 77. On the cult of Russian scientists in Soviet film (including the agronomist Michurin), see Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 240.

63. The original story begins as a detachment of Russian workers make their way east across the Urals during the civil war, where they finally meet Chapayev, the “fiery steed of the steppes.” He embodies the peasant vices of instinct and license, disorder and anger—the earmarks of what I would call an internal Russian orientalism. But his vices become virtues when directed to the Bolshevik cause, feeding the “dialectic” from peasant spontaneity to proletarian consciousness. Clark, Soviet Novel, 84. On the dubbed version, see RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 34 (Protocol of the “Commission to Establish Norms and Standards for Film Dubbing,” of the Main Directorate for the Production of Feature Films, or Kinokomitet, of Sovkino, 1938), ll. 1–8. Sheikov was a graduate of the Azerbaijani State Theatrical Tekhnikum and the Moscow Meierkhol’d Theater. Nikolai Ibabov, “Zhizn’, otdonnaia kino,” Baku, 18 September 1981.

64. RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 34 (Protocols of the conference on dubbing, 28 September 1938), ll. 48–49, 64.
the Russian language and its speakers, already the de facto standards of public discourse since the Five-Year Plans. Russification became an official priority in Soviet cultural life. Moscow now decreed that the eastern nationalities, Azerbaijaniis included, exchange their half-born Latin alphabets for Russian Cyrillic. Their national schools were obliged to devote more time and energy to the teaching of Russian. Their dictionaries and lexicons were outfitted with new borrowings from Russian.

Russification spread into the movie houses as well. Cinema became a mass medium in the national peripheries during the 1930s, reaching millions of new viewers, almost exclusively with Soviet feature films. Yet from Azerbaijan, to Dagestan, Mordoviia, and Kazakhstan, the national cinema industries were in a state of disrepair and dysfunction. Their equipment was as old and tattered as ever. Their movie houses were plagued by transportation lags, electric outages, and a shortage of films. Their projectionists were untrained and poorly paid, sometimes turning into itinerant salesmen to make a decent living as they traveled from town to town. The movies that were screened in the national peripheries were usually Russian productions in the Russian language. In Azerbaijan, because of the complexities and delays in the dubbing process, only a handful of native-language productions ever circulated to viewers. So Russian-language films were first shown for long stretches of time in any given region, only to return months later in their dubbed versions. In the 1920s, pictures were supposed to speak to the nationalities louder than words; by the 1940s, they were being served pictures that did not even speak. Although people still went to the movies, they were less active participants in the life of the screen than passive spectators of an incomprehensible world far away.

Russification was not a simple, unilateral dictate from above. Moscow could afford to be somewhat generous in dispensing its patronage, could afford to negotiate with its national subordinates. Beginning with the mid-1930s, culture came in a high Soviet orbit, which most

66. By 1941, six and a half million people filled the movie houses of Azerbaijan, largely as a result of the introduction of cinema to the provinces. They watched 330 Soviet and only 12 foreign films. Statistics (1932–1941) compiled from GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 211, l. 56; GANI, f. 411, op. 8, d. 61, l. 119; GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 23, l. 4; GANI, f. 411, op. 8, d. 186, ll. 137–41.
67. GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 1141 (Azerkino report to the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, 1940), l. 44. GANI, f. 2926, op. 1, d. 9 (Stenogram of a meeting of cinema administrators, 1935), l. 23. Vostokkino documents (1930) in RGALI f. 2489, op. 1, d. 52, l. 94; d. 20, ll. 37–38, 125, 239; and d. 19, l. 69. In fact, the whole USSR suffered from a “movie shortage” (malokartina) between 1927 and 1937. See Maya Turovkaya, “The 1930s and 1940s: Cinema in Context,” in Richard Taylor and Derek Spring, eds., Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (New York, 1993), 42.
68. GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 1141 (Report of the Directorate for Cinefication, 1940), ll. 62–71. In 1940, of 63 Russian-language films in the Azerkino inventory, only 5 were dubbed into Azerbaijani, including one such copy of They Came from Baku for the whole country. For details on the language of film shown, see appendix B.
nationalities could collect through literary translations and film dubblings. The cinema epics and musicals of late Stalinism, embodying what Katerina Clark has called a “mythic Great Time” and Soviet-Russian nationalism, now celebrated legendary heroes from the Russian past: everyone including Aleksandr Nevskii, Ivan the Terrible, Minin and Pozharskii, Pugachev and Razin, Peter the Great, and imperial warriors like Kutuzov, Suvorov, and Nakhimov. But culture also came in dozens of lower national orbits, each of which followed Moscow’s trajectory, if at its own pace. Through these lower orbits, the Soviet propaganda state reinvented the ethnic minorities of the USSR as subject nations, peopling their pasts, through the historical-biographical film, with heroes all their own. Usually they were writers or philosophers, sometimes legendary, at other times real. In the ideal case, they were contemporaries and admirers of A. S. Pushkin, newly minted as friend of the Decembrist rebels, lover of Caucasus culture, and “father” of the Russian literary language. Lesser Pushkins to be sure, but like him they prefigured the Soviet future in all its glory.

In the Azerbaijani case, Sabukhi, Son of the People (1941) dramatized the life and work of M. F. Akhundov, “father” of the Azerbaijani enlightenment. Initially, with the backing of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, the screenwriter M. Rafili portrayed Akhundov as a secular humanist, the keeper of Azerbaijani national values. The popular musician, Ismail Dagestanly, played him as the “singer of a happy life.” Again we see the legacies of nativization policy. Native cadres created characters to their own liking, in their own image. But in the end, Moscow party censors found Akhundov’s character too passive, too “meditative,” too “pessimistic.” Stalin expressed his own personal wish: the film should depict the “historically progressive significance of the unification of the Caucasus peoples with Russia” and the “vanguard role of the Russian intelligentsia.” With such prodding, Rafili and the director Bek Nazarov edited the final cuts of the film, transforming Akhundov into an active, class-conscious figure, an eager student of the early Russian revolutionary movement and admirer of Pushkin’s poetry.

Moscow touched even deeper chords in popular memories by pro-

70. See the descriptions of Puteshestvie v Arzrum (Lenfil’m, 1936); Syn Mongolii (Lenfil’m, 1936); Pesni Abaia (Alma-Atinskaia kinostudiia, 1945); David Guramishvili (Tbilisskaia kinostudiia, 1946); Alisher Navoi (Tashkentskaia kinostudiia, 1947); Kolybel’ poeta (Tbilisskaia kinostudiia, 1947)—in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my. On the Pushkin cult, see Marcus C. Levitt, Russian Literary Politics and the Pushkin Celebration of 1880 (Ithaca, 1989). For more on the limited revival of national cultures at this time, see Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill, 1969); and James von Geldern, “The Centre and the Periphery: Cultural and Social Geography in the Mass Culture of the 1930s,” in Stephen White, ed., New Directions in Soviet History (Cambridge, Eng., 1990), 75–76.
71. RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 1280 (Script reviews and reports, 1938), II. 2–55. Bek-Nazarov, Zapiski aktera, 216–18.
moting stories set in far-off, mythical times, with simple propaganda value for the present. Viewers in the nationality regions were regaled with glamorous tales about medieval bards and star-crossed lovers. These were films in the neo-folkloric style of late Stalinism. Narodnost' became respectable again. Azerbaidzhan’s contribution to this genre was the musical masterpiece, A Measure of Cloth (Arshin mal alan, 1945), based on Uzeir Gadzhibekov’s comical operetta from a traditional folk-tale, which followed the endearing courtship between the merchant, Askar, and the love of his life, Giul’chara (figure 4). Like other products of Stalinist folklorism, it bore the unmistakable stamp of G. V. Aleksandrov, the master of musical comedies, who once lectured Azerkino cinematographers on the art of making homespun movies, “good-natured” and “kind-hearted.” It also drew from the memorable rhythms of Aleksandrov’s musical collaborators—I. Dunaevskii, L. Utesov, and M. Blanter—who inspired Rashid Beibutov to sing the role of the lovable Askar. Moscow applauded the film as a reflection of Azerbaidzhan “national color,” filled with delightful song and dance routines and several interlocking romantic plots. It was “a gleaming, cheerful subject, developing at a swift tempo.”

While a fun movie to watch, A Measure of Cloth is a difficult movie to assess. On the one hand, it was one of the most celebrated “national” productions of Azerbaidzhan cinema (winner of a Stalin prize), the first to feature an all-Azerbaidzhan cast of writers, directors, composers, and actors—proof of the successes of “nativization” policy thus far. Appearing in theaters just in time for the victory against Hitler, a rather happy and lenient time by most accounts, it was also a favorite movie for the masses, punctuated with light, self-deprecating humor. Some critics have even argued that it served as a refuge for Azerbaidzhan communal identity: as a “sign of the moral health of the nation” in its struggles against Russian domination, as well as a foundational and transitional film, preparing the way for the more genuinely Azerbaidzhan movies (by design and production) of the 1950s and beyond. Yet the

72. See the descriptions of Kadzheti (Goskiprom Gruzii, 1936); Nasreddin v Bukhara (Tashkentskaia kinostudiia, 1943); Takhir i Zakhra (Tashkentskaia kinostudiia, 1945); Volshhebnyi kristall (Ashkhabadskia kinostudiia, 1945); Pokhozhdeniia Nasreddina (Tashkentskaia kinostudiia, 1946); Anait (Erevanskaia kinostudiia, 1947); Keto i kote (Tbilisskaia kinostudiia, 1948); and Dalekaia nevesta (Ashkhabadskia kinostudiia, 1948)—in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my.

73. Quoted from GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 9 (Aleksandrov’s report, “Elementy rezhisserskogo scenariia,” 15 October 1942), ll. 1–2. Quoted from GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 58 (Goskino report, 1944), l. 37. GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 58 (Azerkino documents), l. 99. For background, see Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 74–75, 88–91.

74. At a screening of the film (sponsored by the International Research and Exchange Board and the Kennan Institute for Russian Studies) at the annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Washington, D.C., October 1995), the capacity audience laughed throughout the film and applauded at the end. The quote is from Rakhman Badalov, “Mifologiia Azerbaidzhan skogo kina,” paper presented at the Kennan Institute for Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., October 1995.
movie also left Azerbaijanis with the message that the stereotypes of old were true; that they were members of a captive, folklorized nation; that theirs was a wistful nationalism, really no nationalism at all. The innocent, fun-loving characters of the film, set against pastiche backdrops and bubbling fountains, fortified this message all the more. Indeed, the most lasting images of the Muslim peoples during World War II caught them singing and dancing in the "cinema concert" series, designed to entertain the front line troops with the exotic sights and sounds of the peoples of the east. The whole world may have been at war; but the best they could do was sing.\textsuperscript{75}

During the war, Moscow launched a campaign to promote "love for the motherland," not simply for the Soviet Union but for one's native republic as well.\textsuperscript{76} Movies depicted Russians and non-Russians fighting fascism together. Aleksandrov's serial, \textit{One Family}, filmed in Baku during 1943 with the assistance of several Azerbaijani cinematographers and dedicated to one family's passage through the war, served as a broader metaphor for the big family of peoples in the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{75} For more of the "singing films" of the war years, see such movies as \textit{Tadzhikskii kinokontsert} (Dushanbe kino, 1943), \textit{Kontsert piati respubliki} (Ashkhabadskaia kinostudiiia, 1944), and \textit{Pod zvuki dombr} (Alma-Atinskaia kinostudiiia, 1944)—in \textit{Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil'my}.

\textsuperscript{76} Quoted from G. Abaszade, "Podniat' kinoobsluzhivanie na uroven' trebovanii voennogo vremeni," \textit{Bakinskii rabochii}, 27 March 1943.}
USSR. Yet other films also resurrected patriotic military heroes from the Transcaucasus to stir national pride. From Georgia came Georgii Saakadze (1943); from Armenia, David Bek (1943); and from Azerbaijan, Fatali Khan (1947). They covered the fabled exploits of three early modern warriors in defending their homelands against Persian hegemony, usually with the help of Russia's tsars and generals. Fatali Khan was the most controversial. Moscow sponsored it during one of the first crises of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union still occupied the ethnically Azerbaijani territories of northern Iran and was playing a delicate game of brinksmanship at keeping them, possibly even unifying them into a larger satellite state. To fulfill these designs, the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party rejected the initial script, drafted by several Azerbaijani screenwriters, which painted Fatali Khan in rather sober and meditative tones. Instead, it charged the outsider, E. Dzigan, to center the film around an activist hero, with full attention to the fraternal alliance between the “elder brother” (Russia) and the subject peoples of the Transcaucasus in their “progressive” struggles against the “Iranian yoke.” At the end of the picture, Fatali Khan may have failed in his bid to unite the Azerbaijani lands against the foreign aggressor to the south. But as the wind picked up against his back, he and his troops vowed to continue the struggle, with “the many millions of Azerbaijani people,” until “the day when the sun shines on a united Azerbaijan.” Unfortunately, that day had not yet come, the Soviet Ministry of Cinematography decided in 1948. By then the Azerbaijani crisis had abated and the film’s sharp irredentist message proved too inflammatory. It was stored away in a secret vault in Moscow. Unlike its neighbors, Azerbaijan was not yet ready for such a bold national hero.

This is not life but the shadow of life and this is not movement but the soundless shadow of movement.

Maksim Gor’kii’s cynical lament to the world at the dawn of the film age in 1896 seems equally relevant for the eastern nationalities half a century later. To the inexperienced audiences who first saw films like In the Name of God and Sevil’ in the 1920s on the movie screens of

77. See the descriptions of such films as Syn Tadzhikistana (Dushanbe kinostudiia, 1942) and Otuzhnye druž’ia (Tashkentskaia kinostudiia, 1941), in Sovetskie khudozhestvennye fil’my. Mikailov and Takhmasib assisted Aleksandrov.

78. Quoted from RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 1485 (Materials of the Ministry of Cinematography of the USSR, 1947), ll. 1–6. For background on the crisis, and its political and cultural dimensions, see Louise L’Esteange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijani Crisis of 1946 (Cambridge, Eng., 1992); and Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, chap. 6.

79. Quoted from RGALI, f. 2450, op. 2, d. 1484 (Director’s script). GALI, f. 330, op. 1, d. 16 (Ministry correspondence, 1948), l. 8. The movie was not released until after Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956.

their dusty towns or villages, pictures certainly did speak louder than words. Film told its make-believe stories with a powerful effect, mixing reality and imagination, fact and illusion, life and its gray shadows. Film served the higher purpose that the Bolshevik party had first set for it, to propagate Soviet values in an imagery and language appropriate for the time and place, if always within a strict narrative uniformity. The party reached the distant eastern peoples with images of themselves encapsulated in messages from the future. As local settings gave way to socialist plots, national facts transformed into revolutionary fictions. Moscow could not look upon the borderlands of the east except from its own European center, its own forward position in the moving drama and progress of Marxist history. The more stylized films from the 1930s and 1940s—be they adventures like *They Came from Baku*, or historical dramas like *Sabukhi*, or musical comedies like *A Measure of Cloth*—were even simpler and more direct in their messages. By then, Azerbaijan and its neighbors could not make their own way in the world without Russian guidance. Films created not just new knowledge or fun entertainment, but, through a set of “ideological fictions,” a whole new reality for the east. By inventing national history on film, the Soviet regime reinvented the history of the nation writ large. Cinema helps us to see just how much of a subjective, ideological construct the “nation” can be, made all the more believable by the objective facts marshaled to serve its creation. For under Soviet sponsorship, national traditions became symbols of obedience and authority. The once backward borderlands became the happy colonies, the contented subject nations.81

As I hope the Azerbaijani case study has shown, the nationalities themselves did not always believe these staged cinematic productions to be a fair and true representation of their homelands. They tried to liberate the “national” as an expression of their own collective memory and character. But Moscow confined it to an expression of its own stale orientalist forms. Native protests against Russian ethnic prejudices over the years testify to a resilient national awareness and pride. Yet those very protests were always muted or ignored. The experience in national filmmaking spoke less about the resilience of nativization and nation building, more about the creative power of the Soviet propaganda state to manipulate and generalize national images, to teach a lesson about “eastern backwardness” and the “fraternal friendship and unbreakable unity of the Soviet peoples.”82 The photographs were real, 81. The quote is from Said, *Orientalism*, 94, 321. On the nation as “construct,” see the discussion in Suny, *Revenge of the Past*, chap. 1; and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983). On the use of traditions as “models of command” and “models of ‘modern’ behaviour,” see Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, Eng., 1984).
but communist ideology and European cultural prejudices intervened, emptying the nation of its content, reducing it to a manipulated form, coloring it with Russian privileges.

**APPENDIX A**

**Number of Azerbaijani Movie Houses, 1928–1935**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1935</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central (Baku)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theaters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18 (1 sound)</td>
<td>19/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clubs (open)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clubs (closed)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationary</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>82/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>132/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>125/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: I compiled these institutional statistics from a variety of Azerkino reports (1928) in GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 577, l. 8; GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 479; and (1932–1935) in GANI, f. 57, op. 1, d. 1090, l. 14; GANI, f. 796, op. 10, d. 629.*

**APPENDIX B**

**Number of Azerbaijani Movie Houses and Languages of Films Shown, 1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movie Houses</th>
<th>Language of Films</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baku</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirovabad</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Lenkoran</td>
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<td>Khachmas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakhichevan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
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*Source: The chart's statistics are from GAPPOD, f. 1, op. 235, d. 1141 (Azerkino report to the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, 1940), l. 44.*